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GONZALEZ CARIAS v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.2021-05-17No. 19-2798 NAC

Summary

Holding. The petition for review is denied, and the agency decisions denying asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection are affirmed.

Two Honduran nationals, Claudia and Joxan Gonzalez-Carias, petitioned for review of immigration decisions denying them asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Joxan had alleged persecution by gangs based on his membership in a particular social group of youths targeted for recruitment, while Claudia claimed persecution based on her membership in the family social group. Joxan conceded on appeal that he had not adequately defined his claimed social group, leaving only Claudia's family-based claim for review.

The court examined whether Claudia established the required connection between her feared harm and membership in a protected social group. Gang members threatened to kill Claudia and her family to coerce Joxan into working for them. The court found no evidence that the gang's motive was anything other than recruitment—that is, no indication the gang harbored animus against the family itself based on their biological ties or family status. Because the threats and harm stemmed from general criminal extortion rather than targeting based on family membership, Claudia failed to establish the necessary nexus to a protected ground. The court also found that Claudia and Joxan abandoned their Convention Against Torture claim by not arguing it in their brief and that the record lacked sufficient corroboration to support it.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether family membership constitutes a particular social group for asylum purposes
  • Whether gang recruitment threats establish persecution on account of a protected ground
  • What nexus or causal connection must exist between harm and protected status
  • Whether applicants satisfied their burden of proof through corroboration

Procedural posture

Petitioners sought judicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners Claudia Liceth Gonzalez-Carias (“Claudia”) and Joxan Adali Gonzales-Carias (“Joxan”), natives and citizens of Honduras, seek review of an August 7, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a January 2, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Claudia Liceth Gonzalez-Carias, Joxan Adali Gonzales-Carias, No. X XXX XX1 528/529 (B.I.A. Aug. 7, 2019), affg No. X XXX XX1 528/529 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Jan. 2, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We review both the BIAs and IJs decisions for the “sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513, 516 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and application of law to facts de novo); Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying substantial evidence standard to nexus determination). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Joxan alleged that he was persecuted and feared persecution and torture by gangs on account of his membership in a particular social group of youth targeted for gang recruitment. Claudia alleged that the gangs targeted her on account of her membership in a particular social group of Joxans family. We address only Claudias family-based claim because Joxan conceded on appeal to the BIA that he had not stated a particular social group. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (generally requiring exhaustion of issues before the BIA).

To obtain asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must establish past persecution or a fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b)(1), (2). The protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the claimed persecution, and the applicant must provide direct or circumstantial evidence of the persecutors motives. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346–48 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that the “one central reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (requiring “some evidence” of motive, “direct or circumstantial”). When a social group is based on family ties and “animus against the family per se is not implicated, the question becomes what motive or motives cause the persecutor to seek to harm members of an individuals family.” Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 45 (B.I.A. 2017), overruled in part on other grounds in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596–97 (A.G. 2019). A “nexus [between the alleged harm and a protected ground] is not established simply because a particular social group of family members exists and the family members experience harm.” Id. “The protected trait, in this case membership in the ․ family, cannot play a minor role — that is, it cannot be incidental [or] tangential ․ to another reason for harm.” Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, there must be some indication “that the persecutors had ․ animus against the family or the [applicant] based on their biological ties, historical status, or other features unique to that family unit.” Id. at 47.

But substantial evidence supports the agencys finding that Claudia failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus to her particular social group of her family. The gang members threatened to kill Claudia and her family if Joxan did not work for them. Neither Claudia nor Joxan testified that the gang had any motivation other than increasing its ranks. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (requiring “some evidence” of motive “direct or circumstantial”). Harm resulting from general criminal violence is not harm on account of a protected ground. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313–14 (2d Cir. 1999) (“general crime conditions” and “random violence” cannot support a claim to asylum); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim based on perceived wealth and political opinion where putative persecutors had no “motive other than increasing their own wealth at the expense of the petitioners.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, because Claudia failed to demonstrate a nexus between the harm she suffered and fears and her membership in her family, the agency did not err in finding that she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).

Claudia and Joxan have abandoned their CAT claim by failing to argue it in their brief. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). Our review of the record does not reveal a basis to remand the CAT claim. Claudia and Joxan alleged a continuing fear based on the murder of Joxans cousin and threats against Claudias daughters. But their testimony and evidence did not show who killed Joxans cousin or why, and they provided no corroboration about the threats despite presenting supporting letters from the family members caring for Claudias daughters. Applicants cannot meet their burden if they do not provide reasonably available corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Jian Hu Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, ․ failure to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the agencys challenged decision.”); Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record ․ [the applicants] fear is speculative at best.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.