SUMMARY ORDER
Joseph Rutigliano sued the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) seeking an order under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, compelling DOJ to produce a “prosecution declination memorandum” from the United States Attorneys Office for the Eastern District of New York. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of the government and dismissed Rutiglianos complaint. The district court concluded that the memorandum was exempt from FOIAs disclosure obligations by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which incorporates traditional discovery privileges. Specifically, the district court concluded that the memorandum was exempt under both the attorney work product doctrine and the deliberative process privilege. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
“We review de novo the District Courts grant of summary judgment in an FOIA suit.” N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 939 F.3d 479, 488 (2d Cir. 2019). FOIA generally allows the public to see documents generated by an agency unless one of the Acts exemptions applies. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975). Exemption 5 allows agencies to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “Courts universally read this provision to mean that agency documents that would be privileged in ordinary civil discovery are also protected from disclosure under FOIA. Specifically, Exemption 5 incorporates three judicially-developed (i.e., common law) privileges: the attorney-client privilege, the deliberative process privilege, and the attorney work product privilege.” N.Y. Times, 939 F.3d at 488 (citations omitted).
Rutigliano appears to argue that Exemption 5 does not cover the prosecution declination memorandum based on his view that the memorandum is exculpatory evidence that the government was required to turn over under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 93, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1983). But “FOIA is neither a substitute for criminal discovery, nor an appropriate means to vindicate discovery abuses.” Williams & Connolly v. S.E.C., 662 F.3d 1240, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). DOJ met its burden to show that the memorandum falls within the work product and/or deliberative process privileges. DOJs declaration, which is “sufficient to sustain the agencys burden” and “accorded a presumption of good faith,” states facts supporting the applicability of both privilege doctrines. Carney v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994). As stated in the DOJ declaration, the memorandum is attorney work product because it is a communication “between the AUSA ․ and his supervisor” that contains the AUSAs “personal evaluations and opinions pertinent to the investigation,” “mental impressions,” and the offices “investigative strategies,” all prepared in anticipation of litigation. Supp. Appx at 20; see N.Y. Times, 939 F.3d at 489. Likewise, it is protected by the deliberative process privilege because it is a pre-decisional, intra-agency document memorializing “deliberations concerning an assessment of the facts that were gathered during the Grand Jury investigation.” Supp. Appx at 20; see Natl Council of La Raza v. Dept of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 356 (2d Cir. 2005). The memorandum is exempt from FOIA disclosure under Exemption 5 because it is protected by the work product doctrine and the deliberative process privilege. Exemption 5 is a “categorical” protection that exempts privileged materials from disclosure even if, in non-FOIA litigation, the underlying privilege could be qualified or overcome. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 28, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (“Only by construing [Exemption 5] to provide a categorical rule can the Acts purpose of expediting disclosure by means of workable rules be furthered.”). FOIA does not include a special rule for Brady material. The district court thus properly dismissed Rutiglianos complaint.
Finally, we reject Rutiglianos contention that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the memorandum. “When the agency meets its burden by means of affidavits, in camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate.” Larson v. Dept of State, 565 F.3d 857, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Hayden v. Natl Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
We have considered the remainder of Rutiglianos arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.