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SINGH BASSI v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.2021-05-04No. 19-2878

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jagdeep Singh-Bassi, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an August 14, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a February 5, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh-Bassis application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jagdeep Singh-Bassi, No. A208 563 304 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2019), affg No. A208 563 304 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 5, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJs and the BIAs opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․, the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ․ without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer ․ to an IJs credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agencys determination that Singh-Bassi was not credible as to his claim that members of the Akali Dal Badal Party (“Badal Party”) twice attacked him in India on account of his work for a rival party, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) Party headed by Simranjit Singh Mann (“Mann Party”).

The agency reasonably relied on Singh-Bassis inconsistent evidence regarding when and how many people attacked him, where he received medical treatment, whether he reported his second attack to police, and whether Badal members continued to visit his home after he left India. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”). Singh-Bassi did not compellingly explain any of these inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The agency also reasonably found Singh-Bassis credibility impugned by his submission of affidavits allegedly prepared by his father, his uncle, and a village official that contained strikingly similar language. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has ․ firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that the statements are canned.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The agency also reasonably relied on Singh-Bassis unawareness of Khalistan, which is a hypothetical independent Sikh state that is a central goal of the Mann Party and which was mentioned throughout his supporting documents. See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that there are circumstances when “the nature of an individual applicants account would render his lack of a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and could therefore provide substantial evidence in support of an adverse credibility finding”).

Having questioned Singh-Bassis credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). Other than the affidavits and doctors certificate that the agency reasonably declined to credit due to striking similarities and inconsistencies, Singh-Bassi submitted a letter from the Mann Party and country conditions evidence, none of which corroborated his alleged attacks.

Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the agencys adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.