MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26, alleging that the child was in need of care and protection. During the course of trial, the mother and father stipulated that they were unfit to parent the child and that their parental rights should be terminated. The sole issue that remained was the approval of an adoption plan. DCF proposed that the child be adopted by her current foster parents (preadoptive parents); both the child and the mother supported this plan. The father proposed that the child be adopted by his sister, the childs biological aunt (aunt). Because the aunt resided in Maryland, an assessment through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) was required before she could be approved as an adoption resource. The father sought to continue trial until the ICPC assessment was completed. However, the judge chose not to continue the trial, and after weighing the competing adoption plans, found adoption by the childs preadoptive parents to be in the childs best interests. The father appealed. We affirm.
Discussion. The father argues that the judges failure to continue the trial, and await the completion of the ICPC assessment constitutes an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
“The decision on whether to continue any judicial proceeding is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge, and the judges decision will be upheld absent an abuse of that discretion.” Adoption of Gillian, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 409-410 (2005). Here, trial commenced in May of 2018, but was delayed numerous times.
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In February 2019, the parents stipulated to their unfitness to parent the child and the termination of their parental rights, but the parties agreed that decrees would not enter until the conclusion of the trial regarding the competing adoption plans. In August 2019, prior to the conclusion of trial, counsel jointly filed a motion to continue the case until at the earliest October 2019, to await the completion of the ICPC assessment. The judge denied that motion, and in September 2019, approved the plan of adoption by the preadoptive parents.
During the hearing on the motion for a continuance, the judge found that given the representations of counsel, in all likelihood the ICPC would be approved, and that any further delay would be unnecessary and potentially harmful to the child.
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The judge stated that the childs “life hangs in the balance,” and that the case “[had] just been prolonged for too long a period of time” to warrant yet another continuance. Where it furthered the best interests of the child to proceed with trial, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judges decision to deny the fathers motion for a continuance. See Care & Protection of Quinn, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 122-123 (2002) (no abuse of discretion where “paramount interests of the children involved” argued against delay).
The father also claims that the denial of his motion for a continuance manifested the judges prejudgment of the case, namely that the judge favored adoption by the preadoptive parents without a full and fair hearing of all the evidence. We disagree.
Upon the termination of parental rights, a judge must meaningfully and carefully evaluate potential adoption plans, and must choose a plan that serves the best interests of the child. See Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474-475 (2001). Where there are multiple proposed adoption plans, the judges “task is to determine which plan will serve the best interests of the child, not to afford any particular weight to either plan.” Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 226 n.9 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999). Ultimately, we may only review such a decision for an abuse of discretion, or a clear error of law. See Adoption of Zander, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 363, 364 (2013).
Here, the judge carefully weighed each plan and decided that the best interests of the child were served by approval of the plan of adoption by the preadoptive family. The judge stated that if he were to decide that placement with the aunt was in the best interests of the child, then he would “by all means ․ await the ICPC.” He further emphasized that “nothing precludes the father from going forward with his plan by presenting the testimony of [the aunt], and anything else [the father] thinks supports [his plan] and I [the judge] will give it due weight.” In fact, that is exactly what occurred, as the father called the aunt to testify, and the judge found her testimony to be “generally credible.” The judge credited the aunts “willingness to step forward” and assume responsibility for the child.
However, despite the aunts willingness to assume custody of the child, the judge nonetheless found by clear and convincing evidence that approving the plan of adoption by the preadoptive parents was in the best interests of the child.
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The child, born in May 2017, had been in the care of the preadoptive parents since August 2017. Testimony from the preadoptive family supported “a finding that the child is fully invested in and integrated into that family. It is her home, and they are her family.” In contrast, the aunt had never met the child and had no relationship with her. According to the judge, “there is, other than in a biological sense, no familial connection between [the child and the aunt]․ [The aunt], without fault, is a stranger to the child.” The mere fact that the fathers adoption plan presents placement with a biological family member, while certainly desirable, is not determinative. See Adoption of Irene, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 613, 622-623 (2002) (“A biological and/or a cultural match between child and caretaker is a desirable aim; but it is a single factor among many. It cannot be permitted to generate a placement decision that is not otherwise in the childs best interests”).
Therefore, especially in light of the extensive evidence of the strong bond between the child and the preadoptive family, coupled with the lack of relationship between the child and the aunt, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judges determination that approval of the plan of adoption by the preadoptive parents is in the childs best interests. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. at 225 (substantial deference given to judges decision in custody appeal).
Decree affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The trial was initially suspended due to a serious medical issue within the family of one of the attorneys. The trial also was again delayed when the aunt became a possible placement for the child, as an ICPC assessment was required for the childs potential out-of-State placement in Maryland. See Adoption of Warren, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 624 (1998).
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. The judge stated that if he were to wait until October 2019 to resume trial, there were “so many variables” that “[a]ny glitch in [the] process could push this case out for almost two years at trial.”
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. The judge stated that he “made [his] determinations in this case using the assumption that the ICPC for [the aunt] would be approved.”