MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal from an order of the Surrogates Court of Chemung County (Baker, S.), entered December 26, 2019, which, in a proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 22, granted respondents motion to vacate a prior order.
In 2012, Bernard Braunstein (hereinafter decedent) died and Surrogates Court appointed petitioner, decedents son, executor of his estate and trustee of certain trusts created through decedents will (Matter of Braunstein, 125 A.D.3d 1267, 1268, 4 N.Y.S.3d 663 [2015]). In December 2015, petitioner filed an accounting of the estate; the trusts had not yet been funded because the estate had not been judicially settled. After a conference in March 2017, Surrogates Court entered an order setting a deadline of April 30, 2017 for respondent – who is decedents daughter and the beneficiary of one of the testamentary trusts – to file written objections to the accounting or request permission to examine petitioner under oath pursuant to SCPA 2211. It is undisputed that respondent took neither action by that deadline.
On June 29, 2017, respondents then-attorney requested an SCPA 2211 examination, acknowledging that the request was late but providing an explanation. In an August 14, 2017 order, Surrogates Court accepted respondents reason for the untimeliness, but denied the request due to respondents failure to submit an affidavit of merit from someone with personal knowledge. The court directed petitioner to file supplemental accountings, which would be considered unopposed. Petitioner did so. In November 2018, respondent filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the August 2017 order. Surrogates Court granted that motion, prompting petitioners appeal.
Initially, although Surrogates Court and the parties have treated respondents motion as one to vacate a default and relied upon CPLR 5015(a)(1), the August 2017 order was not granted on default, and none of the grounds listed in CPLR 5015(a) is present here. Nevertheless, “[b]eyond the grounds set forth by CPLR 5015, a court has inherent power to vacate one of its judgments ‘for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice’ ” (State of New York v. Moore, 179 A.D.3d 1162, 1162–1163, 114 N.Y.S.3d 781 [2020], quoting Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156 [2003]; see Hayes v. Village of Middleburgh, 140 A.D.3d 1359, 1362, 34 N.Y.S.3d 659 [2016]). “A motion to vacate a prior judgment or order is addressed to the courts sound discretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion” (Hayes v. Village of Middleburgh, 140 A.D.3d at 1362, 34 N.Y.S.3d 659 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see State of New York v. Moore, 179 A.D.3d at 1163, 114 N.Y.S.3d 781).
To the extent that the November 2018 motion was a motion to vacate the August 2017 order, circumstances had changed since Surrogates Court had denied respondents June 2017 motion. Respondent noted that her initial failure to file objections or request an examination had resulted from her former counsels personal circumstances. Surrogates Court accepted this excuse as reasonable, acknowledged the courts “inherent discretionary power” and “the broad equity power of a court to vacate its own orders,” and noted that it expressly considered “the numerous attorneys who have represented [respondent],” the preference to have matters determined on their merits, and the lack of prejudice to petitioner. In light of Surrogates Courts express consideration of respondents two-year delay in moving to vacate, that such delay was not willful, and the lack of prejudice to petitioner, the court had the inherent discretionary authority to grant respondents motion to vacate, even in the absence of a default (see State of New York v. Moore, 179 A.D.3d at 1162, 114 N.Y.S.3d 781; Hayes v. Village of Middleburgh, 140 A.D.3d at 1362, 34 N.Y.S.3d 659; Matter of Culberson, 11 A.D.3d 859, 861, 784 N.Y.S.2d 167 [2004]). Moreover, considering the public policy in favor of addressing matters on the merits, especially where there are allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duties and self-dealing, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting respondents motion to vacate (see State of New York v. Moore, 179 A.D.3d at 1163–1164, 114 N.Y.S.3d 781; Lovelace v. RPM Ecosystems Ithaca, LLC, 131 A.D.3d 760, 761, 14 N.Y.S.3d 815 [2015]).
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We have reviewed petitioners remaining contentions and none warrants reversal.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
FOOTNOTES
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. Nevertheless, we urge the parties and Surrogates Court to expedite the settlement of this estate, which has, for various reasons, been pending for such a considerable period of time.
Garry, P.J.
Egan Jr., Clark, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.