DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Anthony Senft, Jr., J.), rendered October 25, 2018, as amended November 7, 2018, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment, as amended, is reversed, on the law, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and was sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment of four years plus three years of postrelease supervision.
As charged here, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree requires “knowingly and unlawfully” possessing “a narcotic drug with intent to sell it” (Penal Law § 220.16[1]). The defendant denied during his plea allocution that he intended to sell the drugs he possessed. This is “that rare case ․ where the defendants recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the defendants guilt or otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of the plea” (People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5; see People v. Brundage, 83 A.D.2d 579, 441 N.Y.S.2d 120).
The defendant here may challenge the sufficiency of the allocution on direct appeal, notwithstanding that a formal postallocution motion was not made, because the County Court failed in its duty to inquire further before accepting the plea (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d at 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5). “[W]here a defendants factual recitation negates an essential element of the crime pleaded to, the court may not accept the plea without making further inquiry to ensure that defendant understands the nature of the charge and that the plea is intelligently entered” (id.). When a defendant makes remarks during the plea allocution that cast significant doubt on his guilt concerning an element of the crime, the court has a duty to conduct further inquiry to ensure that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made (see People v. McNair, 13 N.Y.3d 821, 822–823, 892 N.Y.S.2d 822, 920 N.E.2d 929; People v. Petersen, 60 A.D.3d 1365, 875 N.Y.S.2d 717). Where, as here, the court fails in its duty to inquire further, a defendant may raise a claim regarding the validity of the plea even without having moved to withdraw the plea (see People v. Williams, 164 A.D.3d 624, 78 N.Y.S.3d 673; People v. Fuentes, 124 A.D.3d 677, 1 N.Y.S.3d 305).
Here, the County Court merely asked the defendant if he was entering the plea of guilty of his own free will, failing to inquire as to the element of intent to sell which had just been negated (cf. People v. Karadag, 181 A.D.3d 620, 117 N.Y.S.3d 590; People v. Anderson, 149 A.D.3d 766, 50 N.Y.S.3d 552). Accordingly, the defendants factual allocution was insufficient (see People v. Worden, 22 N.Y.3d 982, 980 N.Y.S.2d 317, 3 N.E.3d 654; People v. Rodriguez, 14 A.D.3d 719, 789 N.Y.S.2d 241).
In light of this determination, the defendants contention that the County Court should have inquired into statements attributed to him in the presentence investigation report (see People v. Ospina, 175 A.D.3d 513, 514, 107 N.Y.S.3d 59) need not be reached.
CHAMBERS, J.P., AUSTIN, BRATHWAITE NELSON and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.