More than a decade ago, Travis Goodwin was murdered in Detroit, Michigan. Petitioner Nigel Wright was arrested, tried, and convicted for the crime and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Now, for the second time, we consider an aspect of the petition Wright filed seeking habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he challenges the district courts determination that the admission into evidence of both a statement the victim made to his mother and a statement the victim made to a police officer did not violate his due process rights. We find no merit to this claim of constitutional error and affirm the judgment of the district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, we addressed an appeal from a district court ruling on another issue raised in Wrights habeas corpus petition. See Wright v. Burt (Wright III), 665 F. Appx 403 (6th Cir. 2016). At that time, we summarized the relevant facts that were adduced during the murder trial. We now reiterate a portion of that summary:
Early in the morning on December 29, 2007, Travis Goodwin was shot while sitting in a van parked outside of his mothers house. He died 12 days later from his wounds. Wright was charged with aiding and abetting the shooters, two men known as Worm and Black, by driving them to and from the shooting.
The primary witness for the prosecution was Dawayne Currie, who lived near the scene of the shooting. At trial, Currie testified to the following: He was playing video games with his six-year-old daughter around 2:00 AM when he saw Goodwin pull up and park the van in a driveway. About 20 minutes later, Currie heard gunshots and took his daughter to the back of the house before returning to look out the front window. He saw Black backing away from the van and firing a round with an AK47 assault rifle, Worm getting into the passenger side of Wrights black Charger holding a shiny handgun, and Wright sitting in the drivers seat. Black and Worm were wearing ski masks but he knew them from their manner of walking and distinctive body shapes. Even though it was dark and the cars windows were lightly tinted, Currie could see Wrights face and his braided hairstyle. Curries testimony that the shooters used a handgun and an AK47 assault rifle was consistent with the type of shell casings found at the scene. Currie also acknowledged that, a few weeks prior to Goodwins murder, Wright had paid him $100 to burn a drug house in the neighborhood that belonged to Worm. Currie did so knowing that Wright was going to blame Goodwin. Currie testified that Goodwin was involved in the drug business and had conflicts with Wright, Black, and Worm because of it.
Curries testimony contained some inconsistencies. Although he testified that he told Goodwins mother, Alice Smiley, who shot her son before Goodwins funeral, Smiley testified that Currie never told her who killed her son. Currie testified that he saw Wrights face the night of the shooting, but he told defense counsel before trial that he never saw Wrights face. Currie also admitted at trial that he had lied under oath at the preliminary examination regarding his knowledge of any conflict between Wright and Goodwin. Despite the inconsistencies in his testimony, Currie was consistent in his identifications of the perpetrators. On redirect, Currie testified adamantly that Wright was the person who asked him to burn the drug house, blamed Goodwin for it, and drove the black Charger to and from the shooting.
Other than Curries testimony, another component of the prosecutors case-in-chief was recordings of phone calls Wright made from jail. The prosecutor argued that Wright admitted involvement in the murder when he made statements such as “even if I didnt do it,” “he was out there the night when Trav got shot․ I remember,” and “they know I didnt do no shooting.” Wright also told his girlfriend of his decision to take out his braids and change his hairstyle. In the recordings, Wright alluded to giving Currie and his father something for not going to court or for going to court and telling the truth. Currie testified that Wright offered him money not to come to court.
A third component of the prosecutors case, and the one that gave rise to Wrights habeas claims at issue in this appeal, was the testimony of Officer Thomas. He testified that, less than one month before his death, Goodwin flagged him down while he was on patrol and told him that Goodwin had received threats from Wright, Damien Bell, and Tommy Dickey, who were expanding their drug-sales territory. Defense counsel objected to the testimony as extremely prejudicial and biased, but the trial court held that the testimony did not present a hearsay problem and could be admitted. Defense counsel impeached Officer Thomas by eliciting that he did not put Goodwins concerns in a police report or seek out the individuals making the threats and that he was close to Goodwins family. The prosecutors closing argument referenced Officer Thomass testimony. She stated, “Travis Goodwin reached out to a police officer and said trouble brewing; Im worried about—Im worried about somebodys going to hurt me,” and “he named three people first of which was Nigel Wright.”
Id. at 404–05.
Based upon that evidence, the jury convicted Wright of the first-degree murder charge, as well as of a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The state trial court sentenced Wright to life without parole for the murder conviction and to two-to-five years in prison for the concealed-weapon conviction.
Wright raised numerous allegations of trial error when appealing his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Included among those issues was one alleging that admission into evidence of Travis Goodwins statements to Officer Thomas violated Wrights constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. He also argued that admission of those statements, as well as admission into evidence of a statement allegedly made by Goodwin to his mother, denied him his constitutional right to due process of law.
That second instance occurred during the direct examination by the prosecutor of Alice Smiley, Goodwins mother. While questioning Smiley, the prosecutor elicited testimony that the day after the burning of the neighborhood drug house—which happened a few weeks prior to Goodwins murder—Goodwin told his mother that he knew that the house that burned belonged to Worm and said, “I know they gonna think I did it.” (Page ID 715)
Citing a Michigan Rule of Evidence, the state appellate court found the challenged statements to be hearsay because “they were clearly made by someone other than the declarant and were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. MRE 801(c).” People v. Wright (Wright I), No. 288975, 2010 WL 5373811, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2010). Nevertheless, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the error in admitting the statements did not affect the outcome of the trial given the other evidence of Wrights guilt. Id. at *3–4. Furthermore, the court did not address the Confrontation Clause allegation because Wright had not objected to the statements on that ground, id. at *4, and refused to consider the due process claim because Wright “provide[d] no analysis ․ to support his assertion that the trial courts error under the rules of evidence deprived him of due process.” Id. at *1 n.1.
The Michigan Court of Appeals thus affirmed Wrights convictions, and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to review the matter. Having exhausted his state-court avenues for relief, Wright filed his habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court concluded that, although Wright had procedurally defaulted his Confrontation Clause claim, the ineffective assistance provided by his counsel in failing to object to Thomass testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds excused that procedural default. Wright v. Rivard (Wright II), No. 2:12-CV-14164, 2015 WL 3441154, at *11 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2015). Finding that Wright was prejudiced by the constitutional violation, the district court granted Wright a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Id.
On appeal to this court, all three judges on the panel agreed that Wright established that the admission into evidence of Thomass testimony of his conversation with Goodwin violated the protections afforded Wright under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wright III, 665 F. Appx at 408. Even so, two judges then determined that Wright was not prejudiced by that error given that Currie had been consistent in his identification of Wright as one of the individuals involved in the murder, that a firearms expert confirmed Curries testimony regarding the type of weapons used during the crime, and that the jury reasonably could have concluded that Wrights calls from jail implicated him in the killing. Id. at 409–10. We thus reversed the conditional grant of the writ of habeas corpus and remanded the matter to the district court for such further proceedings as were necessary. Id. at 411.
On remand, the district court noted that its earlier ruling, as well as the Sixth Circuits opinion reversing that ruling, “addressed only the admission of Thomass testimony.” Wright v. Rivard (Wright IV), No. 2:12-CV-14164, 2020 WL 134134, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2020). Because no court thus had addressed “whether admission of Goodwins statements to Smiley, considered in conjunction with his statements to Thomas, violated the Due Process Clause,” id. (emphasis added), the district court felt justified in deciding “whether the combined impact of those statements rendered Wrights trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate Due Process.” Id.
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In the end, the district court did not consider Smileys testimony “sufficient to tip the balance in favor of finding a due process violation when Thomass [testimony] alone was harmless.” Id. at *5. The district court explained:
The extent of Smileys improperly admitted testimony was limited: Goodwin told her that “they” were going to blame him for the drug house fire. This testimony, to an extent, reiterated testimony already properly before the jury. The acrimonious nature of Goodwins relationship with Wright was introduced through Smileys properly admitted testimony that Goodwin and Wright were “enemies or not so good friends.” Similarly, Curries properly admitted testimony that Goodwin would be blamed for the arson fire was more extensive and incriminating tha[n] Smileys improperly admitted testimony.
As held by the Sixth Circuit, the admission of Thomass testimony about Goodwins out-of-court statements, standing alone, was harmless error. Goodwins statements to Thomas were far more significant than his statements to Smiley. Smileys improperly admitted testimony, limited as it was, does not meaningfully impact the harmless error analysis. Wright fails to show that the combined errors of admitting Goodwins statements to Thomas and Smiley were not harmless. The Court finds that these errors do not implicate “fundamental conceptions of justice” and, therefore, do not violate the Due Process Clause.
Id. (citations omitted).
Ultimately, the district court denied Wrights petition for a writ of habeas corpus on all grounds. Id. at *9. The district court did grant Wright a certificate of appealability on the due process claim, however, noting that “[j]urists of reason could debate the Courts holding regarding Wrights due process claim.” Id. at *8.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, it is important to clarify exactly which issues are before us on appeal and which issues are not. In Wright III, we determined that admission of Thomass trial testimony regarding his conversation with Travis Goodwin violated Wrights Confrontation Clause rights. That determination now is the law of the case and will not be revisited in this appeal. See, e.g., Dixie Fuel Co., LLC v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 820 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that “findings made at one stage in the litigation should not be reconsidered at subsequent stages of that same litigation” (citation omitted)). Likewise, our conclusion that that constitutional violation, by itself, was harmless error also is not properly before us at this time. What we are called upon to review in this appeal, however, is Wrights assertion that Thomass improperly admitted testimony, in conjunction with that portion of Smileys testimony that also was admitted improperly, denied him a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district courts decision to grant or deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA), habeas relief “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits” in state court unless that decision: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Here, however, the respondent warden argues that the claim Wright now asks us to review was not adjudicated on the merits but was procedurally defaulted. Generally, we “may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state courts.” Davila v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064, 198 L.Ed.2d 603 (2017). A petitioner procedurally defaults a claim when “(1) the petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule; (2) the state courts enforce the rule; (3) the state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice excusing the default.” Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 927 n.11 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
According to the warden, “Wright failed to comply with a state procedural rule that requires defendants to properly rationalize the basis for claims and provide adequate citation to supporting authority.” Appellee Br. at 18. Indeed, as we have noted, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Wright abandoned his due process claim because he “provide[d] no analysis ․ to support his assertion that the trial courts error under the rules of evidence deprived him of due process.” Wright I, 2010 WL 5373811, at *1 n.1. We disagree with that conclusion, however, and find that Wright did not fail to comply with a Michigan procedural rule.
The district court too found the wardens argument less than persuasive, stating, “The state courts conclusion that Wright abandoned this claim seems at odds with his substantial brief on appeal.” Wright IV, 2020 WL 134134, at *3. In fact, the first issue in Wrights brief before the Michigan Court of Appeals was captioned, in part, “THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF THE DECEASED TO HIS MOTHER AND TO OFFICER THOMAS.” (Page ID 1848) Although the discussion of that issue did include reference to Michigan state rules of evidence and Michigan court rulings on the admission of evidence, the brief also included the following argument (as written, without corrections):
Due to its unreliability, the improper admission of hearsay evidence can violate constitutional due process protections regardless of whether it would independently violate the Confrontation Clause. US Const, Ams V, XIV; See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363-364, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (Thomas J., with Scalia J., concurring) (“Reliability is more properly a due process concern. There is no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation Clause to provide criminal defendants with a protection due process already provides them.”); see also United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 643-644 (6th Cir. 1977) (admission of unreliable hearsay required reversal under due process clause because it extended beyond “permissible limits of fairness”); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We may assume that facially unreliable hearsay would raise a due process issue․”).
(Page ID 1853) In his more than 16 pages of argument on the issue, Wright also discussed the harmless-error test to be applied after the improper admission of hearsay evidence in violation of a defendants due process rights, (Page ID 1861) and reiterated the federal constitutional principle that “[e]rrors which so infect the trial as to render it fundamentally unfair violate the right to due process of law. US Const, Am XIV; Const. 1963, art 1, § 17; McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380 (6th Cir. 1993); Michelson v United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-6, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).” (Quoted as written without corrections.) (Page ID 1863–64)
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that habeas relief usually “does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, even state-court evidentiary rulings can rise to the level of a due process violation if they “offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Wilson v. Sheldon, 874 F.3d 470, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). It was just such a showing that Wright was attempting to make before the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court by discussing the impact upon him of the hearsay violations that occurred as a result of the states overzealousness at trial. We thus conclude that Wright has not procedurally defaulted this issue on appeal.
Although we may review Wrights due process claim, we conclude that the admission into evidence of Goodwins comments to his mother, even in conjunction with the evidence of Goodwins comments to Thomas, do not offend some fundamental principle of justice. As we held previously, the admission of Thomass testimony regarding his conversations with Goodwin, although error, was harmless in light of the other strong evidence of Wrights guilt. The additional consideration of Smileys improper testimony does nothing to change that calculus. Smileys challenged testimony simply noted that an unidentified “they” were planning to blame Goodwin for the arson of a neighborhood drug house. That same information, however, properly came before the jury in much-greater, more-incriminating detail through the testimony of Dawayne Currie. Thus, regardless of Smileys improperly admitted testimony and Thomass improperly admitted testimony, other evidence justified the jurys verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, nothing in the record leads us to the conclusion that had the objectional testimony been kept from the jury, the finders of fact would have been likely to convict Wright of a lesser offense.
Because Wright cannot show that the challenged trial errors implicated some fundamental conception of justice, he cannot establish a violation of his due process rights. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (noting that for an evidentiary ruling to amount to a due process violation it must be “so extremely unfair that its admission violates ‘fundamental conceptions of justice’ ” (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977))). We thus find no merit to the sole issue raised by Wright in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we do not find that the trial errors in Wrights prosecution were sufficiently egregious to violate his due process rights. We thus AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying Wrights petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FOOTNOTES
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. In Wright IV, the district court also addressed a number of other issues previously raised by Wright in his habeas corpus petition, issues that are not before us in this appeal.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.