MEMORANDUM ***
Yinhuai Dong petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) judgment dismissing his appeal after an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on an adverse credibility finding. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review adverse credibility findings for substantial evidence. Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2007). “Because credibility determinations are findings of fact by the IJ, they ‘are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000)). To reverse such a finding, we “must find that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” Id. (quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (emphasis in original)). Where, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the immigration judges reasoning, we review both decisions.” Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)).
The BIA and IJ made two findings with respect to Dongs credibility that are supported by substantial evidence. First, the BIA and the IJ found Dongs explanation of how he obtained supporting documents implausible. Dong produced medical records, explaining that his wife obtained them with the help of a “sympathetic” doctor. His wifes declaration described the doctor as “warm-hearted.” The IJ noted, however, that this doctor purportedly had performed a forced abortion on Dongs wife. The IJ found the recent description of the doctor implausible in light of Dongs asylum declaration characterizing the same doctor as leaving his wife “almost mentally collapsed.” The BIA and IJ thus doubted whether the records were genuine and whether Dongs wife had suffered a forced abortion. Although there are plausible explanations why Dong and his wife might have truthfully described the doctor as sympathetic, “findings of fact are ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary.’ ” Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). This record evidence supported the IJ and BIAs finding. See id. at 1135.
Second, the BIA and the IJ found that Dongs testimony about the penalties he might face for resisting Chinas one-child policy was vague and confusing. Dong struggled to explain whether he would be charged a fine, charged two fines, sterilized, or some combination. Dong later testified that the penalty was either a fine, sterilization, or closing his factory. Dong could not clarify the penalty despite being given an opportunity. This vague and confusing testimony went to the heart of Dongs claim because it called into question whether Dong will be sterilized if he returns to China. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, the agencys adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 1048. It follows that the agency did not err in denying Dongs requests for asylum and withholding of removal. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2020). “An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT protection.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. But where, as here, a petitioners CAT claim is based on “the same statements ․ that the BIA [and IJ] determined to be not credible,” and there is no additional evidence in the record establishing that the petitioner would be tortured in the country of removal, the agency may reject the CAT claim as well. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the record evidence here does not independently compel the conclusion that Dong would be tortured if removed to China, the agency did not err in denying Dong relief under CAT. Id.
PETITION DENIED.