SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Chois Beer Shop, LLC, (“Chois Beer”) appeals from a judgment of the district court, entered September 10, 2020, dismissing its putative class action against Defendant-Appellee PNC Merchant Services Company, L.P., (“PNC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that Chois Beer did not satisfy Article IIIs personal stake requirement because (1) its claim for damages was moot in light of PNCs crediting of Chois Beers account for the disputed annual fee imposed in 2019; and (2) its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on anticipated future charges were too speculative to confer standing. The question before us is whether Chois Beer alleges a personal stake in any one of its claims such that the controversy remains live. We assume the readers familiarity with the record.
I. The claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not speculative.
We review de novo the district courts determination that Chois Beer lacks standing to pursue its claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, see Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2015), and we hold that the district court erred when dismissing Chois Beers claims as too speculative to confer standing.
“To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted). A plaintiff must show more than abstract injury to satisfy the injury prong of the standing inquiry; rather, “[t]he plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged ․ conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has described “imminent” harm to be one that is “certainly impending” or where there is a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur. Knife Rights, 802 F.3d at 383-84. Generally, “[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.” Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ․ if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660).
Here, Chois Beer does not merely allege that it has been harmed in the past or speculate that future harm might occur; it alleges quite concretely that “[PNC] has programmed its computer systems to always assess annual fees on less than 30 days’ notice.” Appx at 5. The fees, it alleges, are “imposed as a planned yearly ‘release.’ ” Id. Although the parties’ contract describes the annual fee as discretionary, the complaint alleges that the fee is in fact assessed “every year.” Id. at 4. And the fact that PNC credited the account of Chois Beer for the disputed 2019 fee does not undermine the claim that Chois Beer is at “substantial risk” of being charged the “programmed” fee again. Taking these alleged facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Chois Beer, as we must on a motion to dismiss, see Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006), we hold that Chois Beer, as a current PNC customer subject to a programmed fee, does more than simply speculate when it alleges that it is likely (indeed, certain) to be charged the fee again.
II. PNCs alternate grounds to support dismissal are unavailing.
We find PNCs two alternate grounds to support dismissal unpersuasive. Both of them relate exclusively to PNCs charge of the fee in 2019, and therefore they would be inadequate to defeat Chois Beers claim related to the future imposition of annual fees. But even in relation to the 2019 fee alone, they would fall short.
PNC first argues that Chois Beer fails to meet the injury prong of the standing inquiry because it did not allow PNC time to investigate and adjust the annual fee under the terms of the parties’ contract. However, whether Chois Beer suffered an injury under the terms of the contract presents a question of contractual standing, not Article III standing. See SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Contractual standing is distinct from Article III standing and does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. Article III standing speaks to the power of a court to adjudicate a controversy; contractual standing speaks to a partys right to relief for breach of contract.”). We will not “essentially collapse the standing inquiry into the merits,” id. at 212 (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 642 (2d Cir. 2003)), and thus we decline to affirm on this ground.
PNC also argues that Chois Beer fails to allege an adequate breach-of-contract claim because it “fails to allege any damages,” insofar as PNC refunded Chois Beer the disputed fee. Appellees Br. at 41. But the complaint did allege damages. PNCs postcomplaint actions (here, the refund) are relevant to determining whether Chois Beers claims later became moot, but they have no bearing on whether the complaint was adequate to begin with.
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For these reasons, we VACATE the district courts judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this order.