SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Qi Xuan Chen, a native and citizen of the Peoples Republic of China, seeks review of a December 20, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming a November 15, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). In re Qi Xuan Chen, No. A XXX XX1 312 (B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2018), affg No. A XXX XX1 312 (Immig. Ct. Nov. 15, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We review both the BIAs and IJs decisions under the substantial evidence standard. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005); also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the inherent plausibility of the applicants ․ account, the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․, the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ․ and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer ․ to an IJs credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.
First, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Chens asylum interview and his testimony regarding where he attended church and was arrested, whether his parents attended church with him, and what police station he was detained at. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 79 (holding that “discrepancies ․ must be weighed in light of their significance to the total context of ․ [the] claim of persecution”) (quoting Zhong v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2007)). And those inconsistencies provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “material inconsistency in an aspect of [the] story that served as an example of the very persecution from which [petitioner] sought asylum ․ afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The agency reasonably rejected Chens argument that he should not be faulted for his failure to mention the church he attended and was arrested at during his interview. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he probative value of a witnesss prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose.”). His other explanations do not resolve his inconsistent statements or compel a finding that his statements were consistent. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, the agency reasonably found Chens account of his escape from police custody inherently implausible. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.”). The agency reasonably questioned the plausibility of Chens account that he escaped from a guarded hospital room through an unlocked window, scaled a fence, and escaped by bus after he ran into an acquaintance who paid his bus fare. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding implausibility finding where applicant testified she escaped detention “just because her jailors were not paying attention”).
Lastly, the agency reasonably found that Chen failed to sufficiently corroborate his claim of past persecution. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicants failure to corroborate his ․ testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). The IJ reasonably afforded diminished evidentiary weight to the letters from his family and a fellow church member in China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e generally defer to the agencys evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicants documentary evidence” and deferring to BIA decision to afford little weight to letter from applicants spouse).
The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are based on the same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.