SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Sharlene McEvoy appeals from the October 31, 2019 judgment of the District Court (Shea, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Fairfield University on her claim of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. McEvoys claim arises out of Fairfield Universitys decision not to renew her appointment as Director of Fairfield Universitys Pre-Law Advisory Program and instead offer the position to a younger person. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and prior record of proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
We review a district courts grant of summary judgment de novo. See Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2018). McEvoys ADEA claim is assessed under the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).
The District Court held that McEvoy failed to show that Fairfield Universitys proffered non-discriminatory explanations for declining to renew her appointment were mere pretext for age discrimination. In urging a contrary conclusion, McEvoy chiefly argues that the proffered performance-based reasons for declining to re-appoint her were factually inaccurate and thus pretextual. It is true that “a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employers asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). But here, even assuming that McEvoy was a high performer, she failed to marshal evidence that the decisionmakers did not believe that her performance was deficient at least in some areas based on complaints received from others. See McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that this Court is “decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff,” but rather “what motivated the employer” (quotation marks omitted)).
McEvoys argument that Fairfield Universitys explanations were “shifting” and “inconsistent” with its response to McEvoys Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities complaint is equally unavailing. While such an inconsistency can be evidence of pretext, see Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013), based on our reading of the record, any inconsistencies pointed out by McEvoy are too immaterial to constitute evidence of pretext here.
Finally, even if we assumed that Fairfield Universitys proffered reasons were pretextual, on summary judgment McEvoy did not provide contemporaneous evidence of age discrimination, other than the fact that her replacement was much younger. The only evidence of age discrimination in the record came from a decisionmakers deposition, in which he described McEvoy as “traditional” and the pre-law program as “antiquated,” “backward looking,” and “frozen.” But as the District Court concluded, this testimony unambiguously referred to particular perceived issues with the program—namely, the type of legal career paths that students were exposed to and the lack of alignment with the strategic goals of the university at large—rather than to McEvoys age. Without sufficient evidence that Fairfield Universitys decision to select a new pre-law director was because of McEvoys age, no reasonable juror could find that her age was a but-for cause of the decision to replace her.
We have considered McEvoys remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.