OPINION *
Oscar Alvarado was convicted of second degree murder after his non-testifying co-defendants statement was admitted in their joint trial and used against him in violation of his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States.
1
The Government concedes that admitting the improperly redacted statement did violate Alvarados rights under Bruton, that Alvarados trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object or otherwise cure the violation, and that any procedural default at the federal habeas stage is excused under Martinez v. Ryan.
2
Accordingly, the only issue before us is whether, under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, the unconstitutionally admitted statement prejudiced Alvarado.
3
We conclude that it did not. Thus, we will affirm the District Court.
4
I.
Oscar Alvarado was accused of robbing a drug dealer and shooting another person afterward. At trial, defense counsel argued that Alvarado was guilty of third-degree murder rather than second degree because the prosecution had not proven the predicate felony of robbery. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder. Alvarado argues that the incriminating, improperly redacted statement of his co-defendant, Cynthia Alvarado, provided the “linchpin” for the governments robbery case. 5
We disagree.
The Government was able to establish the predicate offense of robbery with the testimony of Edwin Schermety, who witnessed Oscar Alvarado enter the park and take something from a drug dealer while holding a gun to his stomach, and Margie Beltran, who testified that Oscar Alvarado returned from the park with thirty Xanax he did not previously have. Beltran also testified that before Oscar Alvarado went into the park, she told him to try to get extra free pills because they had purchased a large number of pills earlier that day. Beltran testified that Cynthia Alvarado then told Oscar Alvarado to pull out his gun if he was not offered a deal. Accordingly, although Cynthias improperly admitted statement confirmed Schermetys and Beltrans testimony, the Government was able to establish the elements of robbery independent of her statement. In fact, her statement was unnecessary to prove Oscar Alvarado committed second degree (or felony) murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
6
Alvarado relies upon Johnson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI in arguing that Cynthias statement improperly corroborated the unreliable testimony of Schermety and Beltran.
7
However, there, the credibility of a witness who testified about Johnsons motive and an eyewitness were each severely impeached by testimony from other witnesses.
8
In contrast, here, the main elements of Beltrans and Schermetys testimony were not contradicted.
The main inconsistencies between Schermety and Beltrans testimony were not sufficient to cause a reasonable juror to doubt their credibility. Schermety testified that Oscar robbed a man, but Beltran testified that a womans voice said, “[H]e took my pills.”
9
However, regardless of how typically masculine or feminine the voice was, the witnesses agreed that someone stole his/her pills.
Next, Schermety testified that Oscar shot from the drivers side window. That was corroborated by another witness as well as the medical examiners analysis. However, Beltran testified that Oscar put his hand over the roof of the car before shooting. But, Beltran admitted that she “didnt really see because [she] ducked and [she] threw [her]self on the baby” who was in the back of the car with her.
10
Finally, Schermety testified he saw the back of the shooting victims head “open up” when in reality she was shot in the chest.
11
However, both a responding police officer and another witness also thought she had been shot in the face. Thus, the fact that Schermety believed she was shot in the head does nothing to undermine Schermetys testimony.
12
II.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Courts denial of Alvarado petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FOOTNOTES
1
. 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).
2
. 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012).
3
. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Habeas petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).
4
. The District Court had jurisdiction to consider Alvarados petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review the underlying merits de novo because Alvarado did not present the issue to the state courts. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017).
5
. Appellants Br. at 4.
6
. “A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(b). Robbery is established when, as relevant here, the person “in the course of committing a theft ․ threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(ii).
7
. 949 F.3d 791, 797 (3d Cir. 2020).
8
. Id. at 803.
9
. JA 158.
10
. JA 159.
11
. JA 111.
12
. Alvarado also argues, relying on Brown v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 834 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2016), that Beltrans credibility is worrisome as she ingested several Xanax pills before the events to which she testified. This Court noted in Brown, however, that the witness had substantial credibility issues because he was impaired from both marijuana and Xanax, changed his narrative, and had a motive to lie. 834 F.3d at 520. Whereas here, Beltrans testimony was generally consistent with other witnesses, and she had ingested Xanax only at the time of the events. Therefore, the concern as to credibility does not rise to the level of that in Brown. McKEE, Circuit Judge.