OPINION *
In April 2012, Alonzo Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, and fifty grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We affirmed. United States v. Johnson, 639 F. Appx 78 (3d Cir. 2016) (not precedential). Johnson later filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied relief, and we denied Johnson a certificate of appealability. United States v. Johnson, C.A. No. 19-1289, 2019 WL 11725403 (Sept. 12, 2019).
In September 2019, Johnson brought a civil action in the District Court seeking monetary damages in connection with his criminal proceedings. In the complaint, which he later amended, Johnson named as defendants the United States and numerous individuals allegedly involved in his criminal proceedings, including District Judges; former Magistrate Judges; the former Clerk of Court; District Judge Ambroses former Courtroom Deputy Clerk; the grand jury foreperson; Johnsons co-defendant Hoots; Johnsons trial attorney and other former attorneys; co-defendant Kellys trial attorney; numerous attorneys with the United States Attorneys Office; various police officers, detectives, and other law enforcement agents or investigators; and the mayors of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Columbus, Ohio.
In the amended complaint, Johnson claimed that the defendants conspired to secure his unlawful conviction, in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, he alleged that: the prosecution maliciously indicted and prosecuted him, falsely arrested him, forged grand jury documents, unlawfully amended the indictment, suborned perjury, withheld exculpatory evidence, and introduced illegally obtained evidence at both the grand jury proceeding and trial; the District Judge should have suppressed the wiretap evidence because the authorizing judges signature was forged; the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the trial; and trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial, calling co-defendant Alford to testify, and wrongly advising Johnson to proceed with the drug quantity on the verdict slip. Johnson also sought discovery to support his claims. By way of relief, Johnson sought over one million dollars “for each day he has been unjustly incarcerated ․ and whatever other relief” the court deemed appropriate.
1
Am. Compl. 14, ECF No. 10.
The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that the Amended Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A. The District Court approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation over Johnsons objections and dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice to Johnsons ability to bring a malicious prosecution action if his convictions are later terminated in his favor. The District Court also denied Johnsons discovery requests. Johnson appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Courts order is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
The District Court properly dismissed Johnsons complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). First, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Johnsons constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence—which have not been invalidated—are barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). See Long v. Atl. City Police Dept, 670 F.3d 436, 447 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 suit should be dismissed when ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ․ unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.’ ” (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364)); see also Lora-Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 505 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he reasoning in Heck has been applied to bar Bivens claims.”). Second, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that because Johnson was arrested pursuant to a warrant, his claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were, in essence, malicious prosecution claims, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (explaining that once an individual is held pursuant to legal process, “unlawful detention forms part of the damages for the entirely distinct tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process”) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted), and thus likewise Heck-barred, see generally Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, many of the defendants were shielded by immunity. Johnsons claims against the federal judges for actions taken in their judicial capacities were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). The defendant prosecutors were absolutely immune from liability for alleged misconduct relating to various stages of the criminal proceedings, and they were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for securing information necessary to the decision whether to initiate a case. See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464–65 (3d Cir. 1992). Johnsons co-defendant was similarly immune from liability for alleged misconduct relating to his trial testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332–33, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). In addition, the United States and its agents, to the extent the agents were acting in their official capacities, were entitled to sovereign immunity.
2
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).
Lastly, to the extent that any of Johnsons remaining claims survived these bars, such claims were brought well beyond the applicable two-year limitation period.
3
See Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Emps., or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1088 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[F]or Bivens actions, we must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations.”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).
4
For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice to Johnson bringing a malicious prosecution action if his convictions are later terminated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85, 114 S.Ct. 2364; Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016). Given that Johnson could not succeed at this time on any of his claims, we also see no error in the District Courts decision to deny discovery requests. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Courts judgment.
FOOTNOTES
1
. This is Johnsons second civil action relating to his 2012 convictions. See Johnson v. Song, No. 12-cv-00098, 2012 WL 895441 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 896410 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2012).
2
. Furthermore, private individuals cannot be sued under Bivens. See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001).
3
. The statute of limitations does not apply to the Heck-barred claims that have not yet accrued. See Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27–28 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); cf. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2010).
4
. To the extent that Johnson may have sought relief from his convictions under the Sixth Amendment, the exclusive means to that end is a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C.§ 2255. Cf. United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 1993).
PER CURIAM