OPINION *
In 2007, Allison R. Illes sustained a serious C2-C3 spinal cord injury after diving into a swimming pool. Her injury necessitated a C2-C3 anterior cervical discectomy and spinal fusion. The surgery was successful. Nonetheless, in October 2008, based on anxiety related disorders that developed after her accident, Illes applied for and was awarded disability benefits. In May 2013, she received notice of a determination that her disability ceased as of that month. Illes disagreed and pursued administrative review. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the determination that Illess disability had ended as of May 1, 2013.
Illes sought review by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Illes had become disabled at any time following the cessation of her disability on May 1, 2013. The Appeals Council also pointed out that the ALJ had failed to weigh the medical opinion of Illess treating physician, Dr. Joseph Mejia, D.O. On remand, the ALJ again concluded that Illess disability had ended on May 1, 2013 and further determined that she had not become disabled for any period of time thereafter. Illes sought judicial review before the District Court. After the District Court affirmed the Commissioners decision, this timely appeal followed.
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Illes asserts that the Commissioners decision is not supported by substantial evidence. She contends that the District Court improperly evaluated the medical evidence, erred by discounting the testimony of her father and sister regarding her ability to perform activities of daily living, failed to provide the vocational expert with an appropriate hypothetical, and erred in determining that she had the residual functional capacity to perform other work in the national economy. To prove her point that substantial evidence is lacking, Illes cites to numerous medical assessments and reports, as well as the testimony of her father and sister.
Our review of the Commissioners final decision is “quite limited.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). “[W]e must uphold a final agency determination unless we find that it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In conducting our review for substantial evidence, “we may not ‘weigh the evidence or substitute [our own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’ ” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552 (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). To the extent we are presented with any legal issues, we exercise plenary review. Chandler v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).
There is no dispute that Illes suffered a serious injury in 2007. Fortunately, that injury was not as devastating as it could have been. Illes continues to deal with several medical issues and has certain limitations that affect her ability to perform other work in the national economy. In Illess view, the ALJ failed to accord the proper weight to the medical evidence and the testimony of her witnesses in determining that she was capable of other work. We are not persuaded. We have reviewed the extensive administrative record and scrutinized the ALJs careful analysis of Illess claim of continuing disability. We conclude that the ALJ appropriately considered all of the evidence, explained the contradictions in the evidence, and provided reasons for according more or less weight to the assessments of various medical practitioners and the testimony of Illess father and sister. That is exactly what is required under our jurisprudence. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Having carefully evaluated the record, we conclude that the ALJ provided a complete hypothetical to the vocational expert, incorporating Illess non-exertional limitations. In sum, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJs decision and we will affirm the District Courts judgment.
FOOTNOTES
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. The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SMITH, Chief Judge.