Nickos Harris appeals the dismissal of his Title VII claims for racial discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed Harriss claims after determining that Harris failed to serve the defendant with process and that his claims were time-barred. We affirm.
Harris was fired from his assistant manager position at Rameys Marketplace in 2019. In January 2020, Harris filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that his termination was racially discriminatory. The EEOC issued Harris notice of his suit rights on January 31, 2020, which explained that he had ninety days to file suit. Harris filed his pro se complaint on May 4, 2020 in the Southern District of Mississippi, naming Rameys and two managers as defendants.
1
Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the individual defendants’ motion because they were not Harriss “employers” within the meaning of Title VII. The district court then ordered Harris to show cause why his case against Rameys should not be dismissed for failure to serve process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Harris responded by filing a proof of service purportedly showing that he had served Rameys through an individual named Thea Curtis on August 4, 2020. His accompanying brief did not discuss the delayed attempt at service of process and merely reargued the merits of his claims. Rameys again moved to dismiss. The district court assessed Harriss attempted service under Mississippi law in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1). Mississippi law provides that a business entity, like Rameys, can be served through “an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.”
2
The district court found that Curtis did not qualify to accept service on Rameys behalf because Rameys submitted uncontradicted evidence that Curtis was employed as a “scanning coordinator” at a separate entity. Thus, Harris had failed to serve Rameys and had made no showing of good cause warranting an extension of the time for doing so.
3
Although failure to serve typically results in dismissal without prejudice, here, the district court found that Harriss claims were time-barred, and so it dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice. Harris appealed.
A district court enjoys broad discretion to dismiss a case for failure to serve process, and we review only for abuse of that discretion.
4
Because Rameys contested Harriss service of process, the burden shifted to Harris to establish the validity of his attempt.
5
Here, Harris has merely repeated the allegations in his EEOC charge and his complaint. Neither Harriss brief to this Court nor his response to the district courts show-cause order addresses service of process. And his arguments to this Court do not engage the district courts stated reasons for dismissing his complaint. Harris does not indicate why he delayed in serving Rameys until the day the show-cause order issued, though he mentions for the first time on appeal that he “was impacted by Covid-19 and had trouble receiving papers from Rameys Marketplace.”
6
We find no error in the district courts determination that Harriss sole attempt to serve Rameys through Curtis was ineffective. Moreover, Harriss delay took his case well outside of the ninety-day window for bringing suit under the EEOCs notice, so any re-filed claim would be time-barred.
7
Because Harris offers neither explanation for his delay nor an argument for tolling, we also find no abuse of discretion in the decision to dismiss the case with prejudice.
Therefore, the district courts dismissal of Harriss claims against Rameys Marketplace is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
1
. Like the district court, we identify the defendant as Rameys Marketplace for simplicitys sake. The defendants legal name is “Double R Foods, LLC d/b/a Rameys Marketplace.”
2
. Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4).
3
. Fed R. Civ. P. 4(m).
4
. Henderson v. Republic of Texas, 672 F. Appx 383, 384 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing George v. U.S. Dept of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)).
5
. Henderson, 672 F. Appx at 384 (citing Carimi v. Royal Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992)).
6
. Even when read broadly, this sheds no light on why Harris was unable to effectively serve the defendant with process, a task which required no documents from Rameys Marketplace. Further, the delays one might attribute to this are not among the reasons accepted by this Court for tolling the ninety-day filing window. See Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publg Co., Inc., 931 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We have opined that equitable tolling can excuse an untimely filing in the following circumstances: (1) the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2) plaintiffs unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because of the defendants intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOCs misleading the plaintiff about the nature of her rights.”) (internal quotations omitted). 7
. Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992) (“If a Title VII complaint is timely filed pursuant to an EEOC right-to-sue letter and is later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not toll the ninety-day limitations period.”).
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.