IN RE: David Kenneth LIND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-23No. No. 19-60038

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order authorizing the sale and the BAP's judgment, finding no clear error in the good faith purchaser determination and properly sustaining the dismissal of the remainder of the appeal as moot due to the lack of a stay pending appeal.

David Lind, a Chapter 7 debtor, appealed a bankruptcy court order authorizing the sale of his real property. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel had affirmed the lower court's decision and dismissed part of Lind's appeal. On further appeal, the court examined whether the bankruptcy court properly determined that the property buyer was a bona fide good faith purchaser and whether the remainder of Lind's appeal should have been dismissed as moot.

The court found no clear error in the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the purchaser qualified as a good faith buyer under bankruptcy law. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the remaining portions of Lind's appeal as moot because he failed to obtain a stay of the property sale while his appeal was pending. Under bankruptcy statute § 363(m), a sale cannot be challenged on appeal unless the court's authorization was stayed before the sale proceeded.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the purchaser was a bona fide good faith purchaser
Whether Lind's remaining appeal was moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m)
Effect of failing to obtain a stay of sale pending appeal

Procedural posture

Lind appealed pro se from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel judgment that had affirmed the bankruptcy court's authorization of the real property sale and dismissed part of his appeal.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtor David Kenneth Lind appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy courts order authorizing the sale of real property, and dismissing in part, Linds appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy courts ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not clearly err by finding that the purchaser of the real property was a bona fide good faith purchaser. See Onouli-Kona Land Co. v. Estate of Richards (In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.), 846 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing good faith requirement for operation of mootness rule in bankruptcy; explaining that good faith does not depend on value); see also Decker v. Tramiel (In re JTS Corp.), 617 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for bankruptcy courts findings of fact).

The BAP properly dismissed as moot the remainder of Linds appeal because Lind did not obtain a stay of the sale pending appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m); Adeli v. Barclay (In re Berkeley Delaware Court, LLC), 834 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2016) (under § 363(m), the validity of a sale of property executed under § 363 cannot be challenged on appeal unless the bankruptcy courts authorization and such sale were stayed pending appeal); Suter v. Goedert, 504 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for question of mootness).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Linds motion to submit a supplemental reply brief (Docket Entry No. 21) is denied.

AFFIRMED.