MPOYO v. FIS MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-22No. No. 19-17562

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Mpoyo on all employment discrimination and leave-related claims, as well as its denial of his request to amend his complaint and its procedural rulings regarding untimely filings.

Kolela Mpoyo, representing himself, challenged a district court's decision to grant summary judgment against him in an employment termination lawsuit involving multiple federal statutes. The appellate court reviewed the case from scratch and found that the district court properly dismissed Mpoyo's claims under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act and Family and Medical Leave Act because he failed to create a factual dispute about key elements—specifically, whether his genetic information was disclosed and whether he requested protected leave. Similarly, the court upheld dismissal of Mpoyo's discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII because he did not meet the initial burden of establishing a discrimination case based on disability, age, or national origin. The district court also properly declined to let Mpoyo amend his complaint after the deadline and struck his late opposition papers, decisions within the trial court's authority to manage its proceedings.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether Mpoyo raised a genuine factual dispute regarding GINA genetic information disclosure and FMLA leave requests
Whether Mpoyo established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability, age, or national origin under applicable burden-shifting framework
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying amendment of the complaint for lack of good cause
Whether the district court properly exercised its docket management authority by striking untimely opposition filings

Procedural posture

Mpoyo appealed pro se from the district court's entry of summary judgment against him in an employment termination action raising federal statutory discrimination claims.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Kolela Mpoyo appeals pro se from the district courts summary judgment in his action alleging federal claims related to the termination of his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Pship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mpoyos Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) and Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claims because Mpoyo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his genetic information was shared with defendant or whether he requested FMLA leave. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4) (defining “genetic information”), § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (requirements for a GINA claim); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (employees must notify employers in advance when they plan to take FMLA-covered leave).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mpoyos Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Title VII claims because Mpoyo failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability, age, or national origin. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth burden-shifting framework under which plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination); Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADA discrimination claim); Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207 (McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA discrimination claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mpoyos motion for leave to amend his complaint because Mpoyo failed to show “good cause.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff seeking amendment after the deadline set forth in the scheduling order must demonstrate good cause).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Mpoyos untimely opposition to the motion for summary judgment, or by denying Mpoyos motion to strike the motion for summary judgment. See United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review); Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court has inherent power to control its docket, including power to strike items from the docket); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Broad deference is given to a district courts interpretation of its local rules.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.