Eric Watkins, formerly a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution at Beaumont, Texas, filed this action against numerous Bureau of Prisons officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The district court dismissed Watkinss complaint for failure to state a claim because his claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
According to Watkins, the district court violated his due process rights because it dismissed his complaint without giving him a fair chance to file objections, even though the court knew that he did not receive the magistrate judges (MJ) report. We generally review a legal question concerning a due process claim de novo. See Heaven v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 2006); see also In re Kendavis Holding Co., 249 F.3d 383, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Watkins received actual notice of the first MJ report, which recommended a time bar dismissal, there was no constitutional defect in the failure to send him the second MJ report, which did the same. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010). Likewise, he received actual notice of the judgment, so his constitutional due process rights were satisfied. See id.
Watkinss right to notice under procedural rules is distinct from the constitutional right to due process. See id. Under Rule 11(d) of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas, Watkins was responsible for keeping the clerk advised of his current address. He also had a duty to inquire into the status of his litigation periodically. See Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 987 F.2d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir. 1993). The clerks office mailed notice of the MJs report and the district courts judgment to the last known address provided by Watkins. Notice mailed to his last known address was sufficient. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). The post office returned the mail to the clerks office with a stamp stating that the forwarding notice had expired and listing a different address for Watkins. This notification reflects that by the time the MJs report was issued, Watkinss address had changed, and he had not notified the court of his current address. Further, it is apparent that Watkins suffered no prejudice as he filed objections to the first MJ report which, like the second, recommended a time bar dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Given that the district court found that he had shown excusable neglect for his late filing of his notice of appeal, it is also apparent that Watkins did not suffer any prejudice due to the district court clerks offices failure to send notice of the judgment to him. See id.
Watkins does not brief, and has thus abandoned, any challenge to the district courts determination that his claim was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.