MEMORANDUM ***
Following a seven-day jury trial, Jamie Matsuba and Takaharo Thomas Matsuba were convicted of mortgage fraud and conspiracy to commit mortgage fraud, wire fraud, and identity theft based on a multi-million-dollar foreclosure rescue scheme targeting distressed homeowners in the Los Angeles area from 2008 to 2015. They were sentenced, by application of an 18-level loss enhancement, to 135 months and 168 months, respectively. We previously affirmed their convictions but remanded the case for resentencing based on the district courts loss and restitution calculations. United States v. Matsuba, 809 F. Appx 390 (9th Cir. 2020). Following remand, the district court once again applied the 18-loss enhancement but reduced the restitution award. The defendants once again appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm the defendants’ sentences but remand the restitution award on limited grounds.
1. Because the district court explicitly determined that the rents at issue were a “loss” under § 2B1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the court was not required to engage in the “gain” substitution analysis as argued by the defendants. Nor did the district court err in its characterization. The rent that the Matsubas charged the original homeowners and other tenants after acquiring the properties provides a reasonable basis for estimating actual loss to the victims because of their fraud. In considering a similar scheme we concluded that it was “pellucid that the rents [the defendant] received represent a value that he took from the owner-victims. It is, by the way, the very value (perhaps among others) that he intended to take from them. Thus, the use of that figure has the virtue of representing actual loss, intended loss and even the offenders gain.” United States v. Harper, 32 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying USSG § 2F1.1 (1994)). That conclusion remains consistent with the Guideline definition of loss. See USSG § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)) (2018). And the possibility that mortgage lenders could also be victims of the Matsubas’ scheme does not prevent those divested of the rent payments from being victims as well.
2. The record supports a loss amount of $3.5 to $9.5 million. As we have previously recognized, “[t]he court need not make its loss calculation with absolute precision; rather it need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss based on the available information.” United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2007); USSG § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(C)). Here, the range adopted by the district court was consistent with the governments loss calculation (approximately $19 million) less reductions proposed by the defendants sentencing expert (approximately $13 million). And, as stated by the district court, that determination was “conservative.” See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2008) (reiterating that “deference to a district courts loss calculation is warranted because the district court is in a unique position to assess the evidence”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in its calculation of the loss amount. See United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. Regarding restitution, we decline to revisit the district courts valuation methodology or the reliability of the underlying evidence in this appeal. See United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the government “acknowledges error with respect” to certain aspects of the restitution award, specifically involving mortgage payments offsets and incorrectly identified victims. Given the governments concession, a limited remand is appropriate to permit the district court to ensure all restitution offsets have been included and the proper victims named.
4. Finally, the defendants fail to show this matter is a “rare and extraordinary circumstance” that requires reassignment to a different district judge. Natl Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015).
We remand for the limited reconsideration of the restitution award consistent with this disposition. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.