SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Jahirul Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of a November 30, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming a March 23, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jahirul Islam, No. A206 912 018 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2017), affg No. A206 912 018 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 23, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJs and the BIAs opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the inherent plausibility of the applicants or witnesss account, the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․ [and] the internal consistency of each such statement ․ without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the agencys determination that Islam was not credible as to his claim that members of the Awami League beat him on account of his position as public secretary in a local chapter of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”).
It was reasonable for the agency to question Islams assertion that he held the position of public secretary in his local chapter of the BNP because he could not describe the partys platform in any detail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an applicant gives very spare testimony, ․ the IJ ․ may fairly wonder whether the testimony is fabricated.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007). Although the agency may err in basing a credibility determination on an applicants lack of doctrinal knowledge, this is an “instance[ ] in which the nature of an individual applicants account ․ render[s] his lack of a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and ․ therefore provide[s] substantial evidence in support of an adverse credibility finding.” Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006). Because Islam claimed to hold a position responsible for promoting the BNP publicly, the agency did not err in questioning his credibility based on his lack of knowledge regarding the partys ideology. See id.
The agency also reasonably relied on Islams conflicting evidence regarding the injuries he purportedly suffered when Awami League members attacked him in 2013. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Islam testified that he suffered a cut in his mouth that bled but was “not that big” and that the rest of his body “was injured” but was not “bleeding or anything.” But a letter he submitted from the hospital, issued three years after the attack, stated inconsistently that the injury to Islams mouth was “serious” and that Islam had lacerations elsewhere on his body. Further, given that Islam could not describe with any specificity the injuries to his body, other than the cut in his mouth that was “not that big,” the agency did not err in questioning the plausibility of his claim that he required a two-day hospitalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66–68 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that adverse credibility determination may be based on inherent implausibility in applicants story if the “finding is tethered to record evidence” or based on common sense); see also Jin Shui Qiu, 329 F.3d at 152.
Having questioned Islams credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency did not err in declining to credit affidavits Islam submitted because many of the authors were interested witnesses who were unavailable for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agencys evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicants documentary evidence.”); see also In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that letters from aliens friends and family were insufficient to provide substantial support for aliens claims because they were from interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012). The agency also reasonably noted the absence of contemporaneous medical records detailing Islams two-day hospitalization, which was particularly noticeable given the lack of detail in Islams testimony and his doctors letter regarding the type of injuries suffered and why the injuries required hospitalization.
Given Islams lack of doctrinal knowledge, conflicting evidence, and lack of reliable rehabilitating corroboration, we conclude the agencys adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are denied and stays vacated.