MEMORANDUM **
William D. Brice appeals from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 putative class action alleging a First Amendment claim arising out of compulsory agency fees (also known as fair share fees) paid to the California Faculty Association. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district courts dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brices action because a public sector union can, as a matter of law, “invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected” prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[P]rivate parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.