Christopher Jermaine Taylor appeals the district courts orders denying his motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, and denying his motion for reconsideration. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylors compassionate release motions. See UNC (stating standard of review). Further, we discern no reversible error in the district courts denial of Taylors reconsideration motion.
On appeal, Taylor also contends that the district judge should have recused himself. Because Taylor did not move the district court for recusal, we review his claim only for plain error. See United States v. Minard, 856 F.3d 555, 557 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating standard of review). Taylor fails to establish that recusal was required. See Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-74 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing valid bases for bias or partiality motion); United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation.” (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
Accordingly, we grant Taylors motion to extend the filing time for a supplemental informal brief and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Taylor, No. 3:15-cr-00009-1 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 10, 2020, Nov. 3, 2020, & Nov. 18, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.