PRIEST v. HOLBROOK 7388W DOE 7423 (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-10No. No. 20-35178

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that Priest failed to present evidence establishing that any specific defendant directly participated in taking or destroying his eagle feathers and failed to demonstrate a prison policy or practice violating his religious freedom rights.

David Priest, a member of the Colville Indian Tribe, appealed after the district court granted summary judgment to Washington State Penitentiary employees whom he sued for allegedly taking or destroying his sacred golden eagle feathers during a cell transfer. Priest argued that the officers violated his constitutional rights and his religious freedom protections under federal law.

The court upheld the summary judgment, finding that Priest failed to establish that any specific officer participated in the alleged wrongdoing. Mere presence at the scene during the property transfer was insufficient to create liability, and Priest provided no evidence showing which officer or officers were responsible for the missing feathers. The court also rejected Priest's attempt to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because multiple officers had access to his property, defeating any claim of exclusive control.

Additionally, the court found that Priest's religious freedom claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act failed because he presented no evidence of a prison policy or practice prohibiting officers from securing religious property. The court also noted that Priest's release from prison in 2018 mooted any request for injunctive or declaratory relief while the case was pending.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether individual officers can be held liable under § 1983 based solely on presence at the scene of alleged misconduct
Whether res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when multiple officers had access to property
Whether supervisory liability exists without evidence of causation
Whether RLUIPA claim survives when inmate released from prison and no evidence of official policy supports the claim

Procedural posture

Priest appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison employees on his constitutional and religious freedom claims arising from the loss of his sacred eagle feathers.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiff/Appellant David Priest, a registered member of the Colville Indian Tribe, appeals the district courts grant of summary judgment in favor of various Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) employees that he claims violated his constitutional and statutory rights by stealing or destroying his sacred golden eagle feathers after he was transferred from his single-person cell to segregation. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district courts grant of summary judgment de novo and “may affirm on any basis supported by the record.” Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2006)). We affirm.

1. The district court correctly dismissed Priests constitutional claims

based on his failure to present evidence of Defendants’ integral participation in the taking or desecrating of his golden eagle feathers. An individuals liability under § 1983 “is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the alleged violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294–95 (9th Cir. 1996)). Although “[i]ntegral participation does not require that each officers actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation ․ it does require some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

With respect to Defendants allegedly present at the scene (Lieutenant David Brewer, Correctional Officer (CO) William Duncan, and CO Doe, aka Jose Barreras-Miranda), Priests testimony establishes that Brewer, Duncan, and Barreras-Miranda were working the third shift, during which Priest was transferred from his single-person cell to segregation and COs packed up his personal property. Our precedent, however, squarely forbids a jury from inferring liability from presence alone. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[H]olding individual officers who were merely present at the search liable for such misconduct would go well beyond what [our precedent] would allow.”). Thus, permitting Priest to proceed to trial on this record would not have “allow[ed] a permissible inference, it would have afforded an impermissible basis for liability.” Id. at 938.

Nor can Priest establish causation through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Even assuming, as the district court did, that such a theory of causation could apply to Priests § 1983 claim, Priest has not demonstrated exclusive control. See, e.g., Jones, 297 F.3d at 939 (Silverman, J., concurring). The record establishes that “six or seven COs” were in Priests unit during the third-shift. This precludes a finding that named Defendants were the only officers who knew what occurred when Priests cell was packed up. And while it is plausible that Duncan and Barreras-Miranda were “at some point, uniquely responsible for Mr. Priests property,” nothing in the record indicates the golden eagle feathers were not already gone by the time Duncan and Barrerras-Miranda received Priests property in inventory.

Priest likewise fails to offer evidence demonstrating that Brewer, Superintendent Holbrook, Custody Program Supervisor Jackson, and Custody Supervisor Alvarado-Jackson are liable under a theory of supervisory liability. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Priests testimony merely establishes that Brewer was present during the third shift. Priest likewise fails to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue as to whether Holbrook, Jackson, and Alvarado-Jackson caused the alleged constitutional violations. Instead, Priest asks us to make broad inferences from the record, insisting his grievances demonstrate an “obvious lack of investigation.” We decline to do so.

2. The district court also correctly concluded that Priests lack of evidence of a policy or practice prohibiting him from practicing his religion is fatal to his claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; see Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). We first note that Priests 2018 release from prison moots any claim under RLUIPA for injunctive and declaratory relief. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (“An inmates release from prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prisons policies unless the suit has been certified as a class action.”); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (per curiam) (same for declaratory relief). Even so, Priests claim also fails on the merits. Priest argues that WSPs COs have a “practice of not securing religious property.” The record does not support Priests contention, as he testified that he was unaware of other instances in which COs violated WSP policy when transporting his or another an inmates religious property.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

. Priest argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his equal protection and due process claims sua sponte. It does not appear that these claims were before the district court. See Priest v. Holbrook, No. 2:17-cv-00133-JLQ, 2017 WL 6328945, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017), revd by 741 F. Appx 510 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing and remanding, and only discussing Priests First Amendment and RLUIPA claims). Even so, Priests additional constitutional claims also suffer from lack of integral participation as discussed infra.