HARPER v. WRIGHT II (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-08-19No. No. 19-55915

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of Harper's claims against Judge Wright on judicial immunity grounds and affirmed the denial of her motion for leave to amend to assert new claims against unnamed U.S. Marshals and security guards.

Caree Harper appealed the dismissal of her claims against Judge Otis Wright and the denial of her request to amend her complaint to add new defendants. The court addressed two main issues: whether judicial immunity protected the judge from liability and whether the district court properly rejected Harper's proposed amendment. Regarding judicial immunity, the court found that Judge Wright's contempt power and custody order were judicial acts performed within his jurisdiction during a status conference held within the court's retained jurisdiction period. The allegedly improper conduct—instructing marshals to use excessive force or jeering at the plaintiff—did not strip the judge of immunity because immunity analysis focuses on the nature of the judicial function, not the manner of its exercise. On the amendment issue, the court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because Harper failed to demonstrate good cause, had not identified or attempted to serve the unnamed marshal and security guard defendants despite filing the case, and had not submitted a proposed amended complaint.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether judicial immunity barred claims against a judge for contempt and custody orders
Whether alleged excessive force or malice by a judge defeats judicial immunity
Whether a district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend without a proposed complaint or good cause

Procedural posture

Harper appealed from the district court's dismissal of her claims against Judge Wright and denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiff Caree Harper appeals the dismissal of her claims against Judge Otis Wright and the denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo the district courts judicial immunity determination, Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004), and review for abuse of discretion the district courts denial of leave to amend, Chodos v. West Publg Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002).

A. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff argues that her claims against Judge Wright are not barred by judicial immunity. “Judges ․ are absolutely immune from damage[s] liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two circumstances: when the judge “acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, Judge Wright held Plaintiff in contempt of court during a status conference for refusing to answer his questions about her retainer agreement and directed the U.S. Marshals to take her into custody. First, Judge Wright acted within his jurisdiction during this status conference. The conference related to settlement issues and was held during the 90-day period of the courts retained jurisdiction, on which the parties conditioned their stipulated case dismissal. Second, Judge Wrights specific action, exercising his contempt power, was judicial in nature. See Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding plaintiffs in contempt of court is a judicial act). That Judge Wright allegedly instructed the U.S. Marshals to use excessive force and jeered at Plaintiff does not change that result, as the inquiry into the applicability of judicial immunity focuses on “the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (“[A] sanction for contempt of court ․ does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against Judge Wright are barred by judicial immunity.

B. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend to assert a claim against unnamed U.S. Marshals and unnamed private security guards under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). “[T]he liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations,” including “where the amendment of the complaint ․ is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, the district court originally dismissed Plaintiffs claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in tort, against unnamed U.S. Marshals and private security guards for failure to effect service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge this dismissal. Instead, Plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion for leave to amend to assert an entirely new Bivens claim against these unnamed defendants. Plaintiff does not claim that good cause supports her request for leave to amend. See Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985). Nor has she taken any action to identify and serve these individuals since filing this case. Moreover, Plaintiff has not filed a proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

. To the extent that Plaintiff also challenges the dismissal of her tort claims against the United States, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over these claims because Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust them, as required under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000).