MURCHISON v. SAUL (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-02-16No. No. 18-15740

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits, finding that the administrative law judge properly evaluated the medical evidence, permissibly discounted certain medical opinions, and relied on adequate vocational testimony to conclude that the claimant could perform his past work.

Bruce Murchison, representing himself, challenged the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance and supplemental income benefits. The administrative law judge had found that Murchison's narcolepsy constituted a severe impairment and incorporated it into the functional capacity assessment, but concluded that Murchison retained the ability to perform his previous work as a teacher. On appeal, Murchison contested the weight assigned to various medical opinions and argued that the vocational expert's testimony was flawed.

The court examined each of Murchison's contentions and found them without merit. The administrative law judge appropriately discounted portions of a psychological examiner's opinion because it conflicted with the sparse mental health treatment record and clinical observations. While the judge did not explicitly assign weight to one treating physician's opinions, the court determined any error was harmless because the judge incorporated all relevant limitations into the functional capacity assessment. The court also upheld the judge's decision to discount a disability determination from Arizona's state retirement system, since such determinations operate under different legal standards than Social Security law requires. Finally, the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert properly reflected all limitations that the record adequately supported.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Proper discounting of psychological examiner's opinion for inconsistency with treatment record and clinical findings
Treatment of treating physician's opinions when not explicitly rejected or assigned specific weight
Whether disability determination by state retirement system is binding under Social Security standards
Adequacy of hypothetical question to vocational expert in reflecting claimant's limitations

Procedural posture

Murchison appealed pro se from the district court's affirmance of the Commissioner's denial of his disability benefit applications.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Claimant Bruce P. Murchison appeals pro se from the district courts affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Securitys denial of Claimants application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and affirm.

1. Contrary to Claimants argument, the ALJ found, at step two, that Claimants narcolepsy is a severe impairment. The ALJ accounted for narcolepsy in determining Claimants residual functional capacity (RFC).

2. The ALJ permissibly discounted in part the opinion of psychological consultative examiner Dr. Sticken. She reasoned that Dr. Stickens opinion was inconsistent with Claimants sparse mental health treatment and with the clinical findings concerning Claimants concentration, persistence, and pace. Those are permissible reasons to discount a medical opinion. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (inconsistency with medical record); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (inadequate support in clinical findings). Additionally, the ALJ discussed the GAF score provided by Dr. Sticken. The ALJ noted that the score was assessed subjectively and revealed only a snapshot of Claimants condition; she found that the objective details of the overall record more accurately described Claimants impairments and limitations.

3. The ALJ did not reject or discount any opinion from Dr. Rogers. That being so, she was not required to give clear and convincing, or specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting or discounting a treating doctors opinion. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (clear and convincing); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence). The decision described Claimants four visits to Dr. Rogers and summarized his treatment notes. Although the ALJ did not assign a specific weight to Dr. Rogers’ opinions, Claimant does not identify any limitation diagnosed by Dr. Rogers that the ALJ failed to incorporate into the RFC. Therefore, to the extent that the ALJ erred in failing to assign weight to Dr. Rogers’ opinions, that error was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (defining an error as harmless “where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

4. The ALJ permissibly discounted the determination of disability made by the Arizona State Retirement System (ASRS). That determination was not binding. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (providing that a decision by another governmental agency about a claimants disability or entitlement to benefits is not binding because it is premised on non-social security rules). The ALJ noted that it is unlikely that “disability,” as the term is used on the ASRSs form, is decided under the same standards as are provided in the social security statute and regulations. That is a permissible ground to discount the ASRSs conclusion. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (holding that an ALJ may discount the opinion of an “other source” if germane reasons are provided).

5. In his opening brief, Claimant does not challenge several aspects of the ALJs decision: the evaluation of the opinions of Drs. Payne and Boatman, State agency medical consultants; the evaluation of the opinion of a State agency psychological consultant; the evaluation of the opinion of treating physician Dr. Puri; and the finding that Claimants testimony concerning the severity of his limitations was not entirely credible due to his ability to attend law school full time and to perform some law-related employment. Similarly, Claimant does not argue “specifically and distinctly” about his contention that the ALJ erred at step three. Therefore, Claimant has waived any arguments concerning those issues. Carmickle v. Commr, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).

6. Finally, the ALJs hypothetical question to the vocational expert adequately accounted for all of the limitations and impairments that the ALJ permissibly found were supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217–18 (holding that an ALJ may limit a hypothetical to restrictions supported by substantial evidence in the record). Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on the vocational experts testimony that Claimant could perform his past relevant work as a high school or college teacher.

AFFIRMED.