MEMORANDUM **
Jose Meza appeals the district courts denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We affirm the decision of the district court.
The California appellate courts determination that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), governs a Confrontation Clause analysis was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in a criminal case, the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court “recognized that, in joint trials, when one nontestifying codefendants confession is admitted only against that codefendant, there is unavoidably a ‘substantial risk that the jury ․ [will] look[ ] to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [the other defendants] guilt.’ ” Lucero v. Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620). The Court, therefore, held that a defendant is deprived of his constitutional “right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)).
The Supreme Court revisited the protections of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford. See 541 U.S. at 50–51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In “establish[ing] a new general framework for enforcing this confrontation right,” the Court in Crawford held that the constitutionality of a statement entered at trial “hinge[s] on the ‘testimonial’ character of [that] statement.” Lucero, 902 F.3d at 896–97 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354). Thus, post-Crawford, “a statement of a nontestifying witness that is testimonial and offered for its truth” cannot be admitted at trial, “absent unavailability and a prior chance for cross-examination.” United States v. Brooks, 772 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014).
Here, the California appellate court rejected Mezas argument that “the Aranda-Bruton rule applies when the codefendants confession amounts to a nontestimonial statement under Crawford,” holding that pursuant to Crawford, “the Sixth Amendment applies only to testimonial statements.” Accordingly, the district court properly held that the state appellate court did not err.
Furthermore, the California Court of Appeals conclusion that Mezas co-defendants’ out-of-court statements were nontestimonial is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court authority, and is not an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We apply the “primary purpose” test to determine whether a statement qualifies as testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). “Under that test, statements are testimonial when they result from questioning, ‘the primary purpose of [which was] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” Lucero, 902 F.3d at 989 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266). In determining the “primary purpose” of a statement, the court “objectively evaluate[s] the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “[f]ormality is not the sole touchstone of [the] primary purpose inquiry,” it is a factor in the analysis. Id. at 366, 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143; see also Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015) (noting that the nontestimonial statements at issue were “informal and spontaneous” and occurred in an “informal setting”).
The record reflects that Mezas co-defendants’ out-of-court statements were nontestimonial. The statements were spoken to fellow gang members, effectively bragging about the shooting. The informality of the statements is further evinced by the speakers’ use of nicknames and slang words, the discussion of things other than the shooting, including buying guns and obtaining money from the gang, and the location of the conversation: a co-defendants own home. See Clark, 576 U.S. at 247, 135 S.Ct. 2173. Accordingly, the primary purpose of the pertinent conversations was not “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
AFFIRMED.