MEMORANDUM **
Claimant Joshua Woolery appeals the district courts judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Securitys decision to deny his claim for benefits. Reviewing for substantial evidence the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJ”) factual findings, Biestek v. Berryhill, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019), we affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJs weighing of the medical evidence because one examining psychologist, two nonexamining psychologists, and an employment consultant each opined that Claimant was capable of working. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that nonexamining physicians’ opinions may “serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record”). Claimants argument that several examining psychologists, other nonexamining psychologists, and a treating therapist reached the contrary conclusion does not change the fact that “more than a mere scintilla [of evidence], but less than a preponderance”—that is, substantial evidence, Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)—supports the ALJs assessment.
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The ALJ permissibly discounted Claimants preferred psychologists’ opinions by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating h[er] interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as substantial evidence supports the ALJs findings, it is for the ALJ to weigh competing medical evidence. Treichler v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014).
2. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons,” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), for concluding that “[C]laimants statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Plaintiff, for example, argues that he struggled to do basic volunteer work at a food bank while supervised by an employment consultant. The ALJ permissibly noted that (1) the consultant gave Claimant positive reviews and (2) Claimant previously testified that he had no trouble with that work because it was simple. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation”). The ALJ also permissibly noted that Claimant received a fair review of his volunteer painting work, despite Claimants testimony to the contrary. See Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137 (“Inconsistencies between a claimants testimony and the claimants reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse credibility determination.”).
3. The ALJ provided the requisite “germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ permissibly noted that (1) the assessment from Claimants high school was dated; (2) the record contradicted parts of Claimants fathers statements that Claimant lacked social skills, follow-through, and the ability to work independently; and (3) the employment consultant stated recommendations, rather than imperatives.
4. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJs conclusions regarding evidence from witnesses and Claimant, we see no error in the ALJs residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination or in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. See Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the ALJ is “free to accept or reject” additional restrictions proposed by a claimants lawyer so long as the ALJs final determination is “supported by substantial evidence”). Under our precedents, it matters not that substantial evidence may well support an RFC that includes greater limitations, too. See Flaten v. Secy of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Secretarys conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.”).
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. Claimants therapist is not an “acceptable medical source,” and the ALJ need only provide germane reasons for discounting the therapists opinions. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902(a), 416.927(f).