UNITED STATES v. MEDBERY (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-02-09No. No. 20-30067

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the acceptance of responsibility reduction and the firearm enhancement, but reversed the denial of safety-valve eligibility, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing to allow the trial court to determine whether Medbery qualifies for statutory safety-valve relief.

Jeremy David Medbery appealed his 84-month prison sentence for methamphetamine possession with intent to distribute and distribution. The appellate court addressed three sentencing issues: whether the trial court properly denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, whether it correctly applied a firearm enhancement, and whether it erroneously excluded Medbery from safety-valve relief.

The court upheld the trial court's rejection of the responsibility reduction, finding that Medbery's contested denial of the drug quantity and incomplete cooperation satisfied the court's reasoning. The court also upheld the firearm enhancement, determining that Medbery's own statements to law enforcement about the gun's location in his truck, combined with officers finding it there, established sufficient connection between the weapon and his drug offense.

However, the court found error in the trial court's determination that the firearm enhancement automatically disqualified Medbery from statutory safety-valve relief. The court held that these are separate inquiries with different evidentiary standards and that Medbery must receive a new sentencing hearing to demonstrate safety-valve eligibility.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether denial of acceptance of responsibility reduction was clear error
Whether firearm enhancement was properly applied to drug offense
Whether firearm enhancement automatically bars safety-valve eligibility
Evidentiary standards for firearm connection versus safety-valve qualification

Procedural posture

Medbery appealed his sentencing on a conviction for drug possession with intent to distribute and distribution.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Defendant Jeremy David Medbery appeals his criminal sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and for distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Reviewing the district courts factual findings for clear error and its interpretation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and federal statutes de novo, United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007), we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.

1. The district court did not clearly err by rejecting Defendants request for U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1’s two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We give “great deference” to a district judges application of § 3E1.1. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1284 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5). The district court permissibly found that Defendant contested “essential elements of his guilt,” such as the quantity of drugs he possessed, making “his burden to demonstrate a clear acceptance of responsibility ․ high.” United States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendants post-arrest cooperation and admission to “some, though not all, of his conduct” was insufficient. Id.

2. The district court permissibly applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s two-level enhancement. The court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant possessed a handgun when he sold drugs to an informant and that it was not “clearly improbable” that the firearm had a connection to Defendants offense. See United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding “that if a party has knowledge of the weapon and both the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over it, then he has constructive possession”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.11(A) (stating that the enhancement does not apply if the defendant proves that it is “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense”). Following his arrest, Defendant told officers that his Hi-Point ninemillimeter pistol was located under the center console of his pickup truck from which he participated in a controlled sale of methamphetamine. Law enforcement agents then found exactly that weapon, loaded, in exactly that location when they searched the truck. Defendants attempt to liken his case to United States v. Kelso is misplaced because there, “[a]lthough [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there [wa]s no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence.” 942 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1991). Here there is such evidence. Consequently, we need not consider Defendants alternative arguments. See United States v. Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that harmless error applies at sentencing).

3. The district court erred in concluding that Defendant was ineligible for 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve” because he had received U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s firearm enhancement. See United States v. Nelson, 222 F.3d 545, 550–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant must prove only by a preponderance of the evidence that his firearm lacked a connection to his offense while he must prove that connection is “clearly improbable” to avoid § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s enhancement). Contrary to the governments assertion, we do not review that claim for plain error because Defendant argued at sentencing that he remains eligible for the safety valve with or without § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s enhancement. Indeed, the district court explicitly stated that Defendant had preserved the argument for appeal. Thus, our traditional rule applies: an error in interpreting the safety-valve statute, which the district court committed, requires resentencing. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1109. We therefore vacate Defendants sentence and remand for the district court to determine whether Defendant can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he qualifies for § 3553(f)’s safety valve. If the district court answers that question in the affirmative, it shall conduct a full resentencing. See id. (holding that “[t]he type of discretion afforded a court that is restrained by a statutory minimum is wholly unlike that afforded one that is not”).

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.