NALL v. WILLIAMS (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-01-27No. No. 19-16894

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Nall's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to state a plausible cause of action, as Nevada statutory law does not establish a liberty interest in parole eligibility that would warrant constitutional procedural protections.

Tyrone Nall, a Nevada state prisoner, appealed the dismissal of his federal civil rights lawsuit challenging a calculation of his parole eligibility date. He claimed the state violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal and found that Nall's complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to state a valid due process claim because Nevada law does not create a liberty interest in parole eligibility that would trigger constitutional protections.

The court also upheld the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Nall's related state law claims once the federal claims were dismissed. The appellate court declined to address arguments that Nall did not clearly raise in his opening brief.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether parole eligibility calculations trigger due process protections
Whether Nevada law creates a liberty interest in parole eligibility
Proper exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims

Procedural posture

A state prisoner appealed pro se from a district court's dismissal of his federal civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Tyrone T.H. Nall appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process claim arising from an alleged miscalculation of his parole eligibility date. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district courts dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Nalls Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because Nall failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (when analyzing a due process claim, “[w]e first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient”); Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nevadas statutory parole scheme ․ expressly disclaims any intent to create a liberty interest.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Nalls related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review; court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.