CARTER v. SANDOVAL (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-09-20No. No. 20-16539

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's dismissal of Carter's civil rights action was affirmed because he failed to state viable claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause, failed to present a valid plea agreement breach claim under the bar established by Heck v. Humphrey, and lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole eligibility under Nevada law.

Shannon Carter, an incarcerated Nevada resident, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming prison officials violated his constitutional rights by miscalculating when he became eligible for parole. The district court dismissed the case, and Carter appealed on his own behalf. The appeals court reviewed the dismissal and agreed with the lower court's decision to reject all of Carter's claims.

Carter argued that officials violated the Ex Post Facto Clause—a constitutional provision barring laws that retroactively punish conduct—by failing to properly apply sentence credits to his parole eligibility date. However, the court found that officials actually misapplied the law rather than deliberately applying an older, harsher rule. Carter also claimed officials breached his plea agreement, but this challenge essentially questioned whether his conviction was valid, a type of claim that cannot proceed in a civil rights lawsuit without first overturning the conviction. Finally, Carter asserted he was deprived of due process and subjected to cruel punishment through loss of parole eligibility, but Nevada law does not recognize parole eligibility as a protected constitutional right, so this claim failed as well.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether miscalculation of parole eligibility violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
Whether challenging parole calculation procedures violates due process or the Eighth Amendment
Whether Nevada law creates a protected liberty interest in parole eligibility
Whether claims challenging parole eligibility constitute barred attacks on conviction validity

Procedural posture

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the district court's dismissal of Carter's pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Shannon Carter, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se the district courts judgment dismissing his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights when they miscalculated his parole eligibility date. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Carter failed to state a claim that defendants violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by failing to apply sentence credits to his parole eligibility under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.4465(7)(b) (1997). See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (to fall within ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective and must disadvantage the offender affected by it by increasing his punishment). As the district court correctly found, the Nevada Court of Appeals’ order attached to Carters complaint shows that under Williams v. State Dept of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 402 P.3d 1260, 1262-65 (2017), defendants misapplied § 209.4465(7)(b), rather than retroactively applying the less favorable parole eligibility rules set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.4465(8) (2007).

The district court properly dismissed Carters claim that defendants breached his plea agreement as that claim challenges the validity of his conviction and thus is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Carter failed to state a due process or Eighth Amendment claim based on deprivation of parole eligibility because he possessed no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole eligibility in Nevada. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (if a substantive interest is left to the states unfettered discretion, then state statutes creating formal procedures surrounding that discretion do not create a liberty interest); Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nevada law does not create liberty interest in parole).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Carters motion for reconsideration and appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.

AFFIRMED.