SAVAGE v. SAVAGE (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-08-25No. No. 20-17297

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the denial of postjudgment motions for reconsideration.

Colette Claire Savage appealed a federal district court judgment dismissing her diversity action that sought to challenge prior state court judgments from Texas and California. The appellate court applied de novo review to the dismissal and affirmed the lower court's decision. The district court properly invoked the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Savage's federal lawsuit constituted an impermissible attempt to appeal state court decisions and that her claims were inextricably intertwined with the state judgments she sought to overturn. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Savage's postjudgment motions for reconsideration because she failed to present any valid grounds warranting such relief under the applicable procedural rules.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction over claims challenging prior state court judgments
Whether claims are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions when federal adjudication would undercut the state ruling
Whether a district court abused its discretion in denying postjudgment motions for reconsideration

Procedural posture

Colette Claire Savage appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing her diversity action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and denying her postjudgment motions for reconsideration.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

Colette Claire Savage appeals pro se from the district courts judgment in her diversity action challenging past Texas and California state court judgments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Savages action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it was a “forbidden de facto appeal” of prior state court decisions and Savage raised claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with those state court decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars “inextricably intertwined” claims where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Savages postjudgment motions for reconsideration because Savage failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).

AFFIRMED.