BIFELT v. ALASKA (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-07-30No. No. 20-35338

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from lethal force under these circumstances was not clearly established at the time of the shooting.

Paula Bifelt, as representative of Tristan Vent's estate, brought federal and state claims against Alaska State Troopers and the State of Alaska following Vent's fatal shooting during a 2015 standoff. Bifelt alleged excessive force under federal law and failure to train under state negligence law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the appellate court upheld that decision.

On appeal, Bifelt challenged the exclusion of an expert report suggesting the encounter was a preventable "suicide by cop" scenario with available less-lethal alternatives. The court found that where objective video evidence exists, an expert opinion alone cannot defeat summary judgment by merely characterizing officer conduct as imprudent or reckless. The court further determined that the officers' use of force was reasonable and that they were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law at the time of the shooting would have notified reasonable officers that their conduct—involving multiple de-escalation attempts before the suspect grabbed a firearm—violated constitutional rights.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an expert report characterizing police conduct as imprudent can overcome summary judgment when objective video evidence exists
Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of force after de-escalation attempts when a suspect reaches for a firearm
Whether the right to be free from lethal force was clearly established under the specific circumstances present

Procedural posture

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Troopers and the State of Alaska on federal excessive force and state negligence claims, and the plaintiff appealed that decision.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM *

On September 8, 2015, Tristan Percy Vent (“Vent”) was fatally shot during a standoff with Alaska State Troopers (“Troopers”) and Fairbanks Police Department Officers. As personal representative of Vents Estate, Paula Ann Bifelt sued the Troopers under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Alaska law for excessive force, and sued the State of Alaska (“Alaska”) under a failure-to-train theory based on state negligence law.

The Troopers and Alaska moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district court granted. We affirm.

Because the facts leading up to the shooting of Vent are undisputed, we do not recite them here.

On appeal, Bifelt contends the district court erred in rejecting the submission of a “police practices expert” report that opined that the encounter with Vent was a preventable “suicide by cop” scenario and “that certain less-lethal weapons were on the scene and available to the troopers for their immediate use.” However, because objective video evidence captured the Troopers’ encounter with Vent, the district court correctly concluded that Bifelt cannot “avoid[ ] summary judgment by simply producing an experts report that an officers conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless.” Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) abrogated on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546, 198 L.Ed.2d 52 (2017); City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (same).

The district court also concluded that the Troopers’ use of force was reasonable and that “regardless of the constitutionality of their actions, the Troopers would be entitled to qualified immunity here.” We address “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the Troopers’] alleged misconduct.” See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that either prong of the qualified immunity analysis may be addressed first).

Vents right to be free from lethal force at the time the fatal shooting occurred was not clearly established. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 16, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015). “[N]either Supreme Court nor circuit precedent in existence as of” September 8, 2015, “would have put a reasonable officer in the [Troopers’] position on notice that using deadly force in the particular circumstances”—after multiple attempts at de-escalation—“would violate [Vents] Fourth Amendment rights.” Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Estate does not identify any case clearly establishing that officers acting under similar circumstances—who undertook extensive efforts to deescalate a standoff yet the suspect grabbed a firearm off the ground—were held to have violated the suspects Fourth Amendment rights. We recognize Vents death represents a tragic loss. However, under our precedent, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

. On appeal, Bifelt does not brief the district courts dismissal of the negligence claim, accordingly, this claim is abandoned. See Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1988).

. See Bifelt v. Alaska, No. 4:18-CV-00017 JWS, 2020 WL 1046816, at *2 (D. Alaska Mar. 3, 2020).

. The qualified immunity analysis is equally applicable to the state excessive force claim: “The use of excessive force is a statutory violation under Alaska law and may also run afoul of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, both of which grant citizens a right to be secure in their persons and protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 900–01 (Alaska 2013) (internal quotations omitted). See Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 803 (Alaska 2011) (“[A]n officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officers conduct was an objectively reasonable use of force or the officer reasonably believed that the conduct was lawful” which analysis “recognizes that there may be behavior that is objectively unreasonable but that nonetheless an officer might have reasonably believed was reasonable. If this is the case, then the officer should be entitled to qualified immunity for his behavior.”).