KERTESZ v. FERGUSON (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-07-01No. No. 20-35573

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Kertesz's failure to allege sufficient facts to establish Article III standing.

Gabriella Kertesz appealed pro se from a district court dismissal of her civil rights lawsuit against Washington State's Attorney General, Bob Ferguson, challenging a state law regarding medical consent forms. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Kertesz had failed to establish Article III standing because she did not allege facts demonstrating she suffered a concrete injury, that the defendant's conduct caused that injury, or that a favorable court decision would remedy it. Kertesz argued that the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction stripped the appellate court of authority to hear the appeal, but the court rejected this argument as meritless.

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Key issues

Whether plaintiff established Article III standing
Whether dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction divested appellate jurisdiction
Requirements for demonstrating concrete injury and causation

Procedural posture

Kertesz appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing her § 1983 civil rights action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Gabriella Kertesz appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Bob Ferguson, the Attorney General of Washington State, violated her civil rights in connection with a state law that concerns medical consent forms. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kerteszs action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Kertesz failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (to establish standing, a plaintiff must allege that she “has suffered concrete injury, that there is a causal connection between [her] injury and the conduct complained of, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision”); Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The burden of showing that there is standing rests on the shoulders of the party asserting it.”).

We reject as without merit Kerteszs contention, set forth in her supplemental filing, that the district courts dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction divested this court of jurisdiction over the appeal.

AFFIRMED.