VALENCIA v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-14No. No. 20-55245

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County was affirmed because Valencia failed to establish genuine disputes of material fact supporting his claims that the County was vicariously liable for Collins' actions, negligently supervised or retained Collins, or violated his rights through a county policy or custom.

Grant Valencia sued Los Angeles County after being arrested for participating in an illegal drug transportation scheme. Valencia claimed that former sheriff's deputy Kenneth Collins, who had mentored him years earlier at a county leadership academy, recruited him into the scheme. Valencia argued the County was liable because it should have foreseen Collins' criminal propensities based on theft complaints filed against him and because it inadequately investigated those complaints.

The appellate court found no genuine disputes of material fact that would support Valencia's claims. The court reasoned that Collins was not acting within the scope of his employment when he recruited Valencia into the drug scheme—the recruitment occurred years after their mentoring relationship ended and stemmed from Collins' personal business venture. Additionally, even if the County had inadequately investigated the theft complaints against Collins, those investigations revealed no facts that should have led the County to foresee that Collins would later recruit someone into a drug-running operation. A prior propensity to steal money bears no meaningful connection to recruiting someone into drug trafficking.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a sheriff's deputy was acting within the scope of employment when recruiting someone into an illegal drug scheme years after an earlier mentoring relationship
Whether prior theft complaints against an employee establish inadequate investigation or retention when the alleged harm—recruitment into drug trafficking—differs from the known propensity
Whether a municipality can be held liable under Monell for a private citizen's injuries when the municipality did not directly cause harm through its policies or customs

Procedural posture

Valencia appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles on his claims arising from his recruitment into an illegal drug transportation scheme by a former sheriff's deputy.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Grant Valencia (“Valencia” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from the district courts order granting the County of Los Angeles’ (“the County” or “Defendant”) motion for summary judgment.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. We review the district courts grant of summary judgment de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013).

1. The district court correctly held that former sheriffs deputy Kenneth Collins was not “act[ing] within the scope of his employment when he recruited Plaintiff to his scheme and engaged in the illegal transport of controlled substances.” Valencia asserts that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he agreed to participate in the scheme because he trusted Collins due to the relationship they fostered when Collins mentored him at the Emerging Leaders Academy (the “ELA”), the significance being that Collins may have been acting in the scope of his employment when he taught and mentored students as a sheriffs deputy at the ELA. However, such a factual dispute is not material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). The issue is whether Collins was acting within the scope of his employment when committing the act that allegedly caused an injury to Valencia. See Cal. Govt Code § 815.2. Here, the relevant act occurred when Collins asked Valencia to participate in the illegal scheme that led to Valencias arrest. Collins was not acting within the scope of his employment as a sheriffs deputy when he asked Valencia to be a part of the illegal scheme, years after both he and Valencia were no longer involved in the ELA, and where Collins initially re-established contact with Valencia on a personal basis by asking Valencia to get involved with Collins’ life-coaching business, a private business endeavor.

2. The district court correctly held that “the undisputed facts are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a claim for negligent supervision or retention.” No genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the County adequately investigated civilian theft complaints against Collins. Out of six complaints lodged against Collins, Valencia alleges that the County inadequately investigated two. For a 2008 complaint, Valencia simply points out that it resulted in no determination, but does not explain why the investigation was inadequate. For the other investigation into a 2014 complaint, the record shows that the sheriffs department contacted the complainant and his attorney multiple times to collect evidence, but neither followed through to provide it. On this record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the adequacy of either investigation.

We also agree with the district court that “Collins’ alleged propensity for stealing money from civilians has little relation to his ultimate act of recruiting Plaintiff for an illegal drug transportation operation.” We see no reason why the County should have foreseen, due to the theft complaints, that Collins would one day recruit someone like Valencia for a drug-running scheme and therefore should not have retained Collins. As the district court explained, “[l]iability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes,” quoting Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1054, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 (1996) (emphases added and citation omitted). The district court correctly concluded that “the hazard that Defendant[ ] [is] charged to have had reason to suspect [its] employment of Collins created—the risk of theft—is not similar to the harm that actually occurred—Collins’ recruitment of Plaintiff into his illegal scheme to transport drugs.”

3. Finally, the district court properly rejected the Monell claim. As noted, there is neither a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the adequacy of the investigations into Collins, nor the requisite connection between Collins’ alleged propensity to steal money and his involvement in the transportation of drugs. Because the County did not injure Valencia by its investigations of the complaints against Collins, or by its retention of Collins, Valencia was not injured by the “execution of a governments policy or custom.” Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those necessary to explain our decision.