MEMORANDUM **
Yvonne Reed appeals pro se from the district courts order dismissing her Title VII employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); ODonnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Reeds action as time-barred because Reed filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run and failed to show extraordinary circumstances beyond her control that justified equitable tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (setting forth 90-day period in which Title VII complainant may bring a civil action); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. Pship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (90-day period operates as a limitations period; if a litigant does not file suit within 90 days of receipt of the notice of right to sue, the action is time-barred); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control made it impossible to file a claim on time”).
AFFIRMED.