MEMORANDUM ***
Brian Handel appeals from the district courts order affirming the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Handel was not disabled under the Act because he had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). Handel challenges the ALJs residual functional capacity determination, arguing that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinions of his treating physicians, Handels subjective testimony, and the testimony of a lay witness. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
We review the district courts order de novo and reverse only if the decision of the ALJ “was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds. The ALJ determined that Handel was last insured on December 31, 2016, meaning that he was required to establish that he was disabled on or before that date to be entitled to benefits. Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2017).
The ALJ did not commit reversible error when evaluating the medical evidence. Handel argues that the ALJ failed to consider a treating physicians note that Handel was “unable to sit or stand for any time [without] having to change position.” This statement falls under the “subjective” section of the physicians notes and is thus not a “medical opinion” because it does not “reflect [the physicians] judgments about the nature and severity” of Handels impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). Handel also argues that the ALJ failed to consider medical opinions from examinations that postdate his last date insured. “[M]edical evaluations made after the expiration of a claimants insured status are relevant to an evaluation of the pre-expiration condition.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, however, the opinions Handel cites as improperly omitted from the ALJs decision relate to Handels recovery from a surgery he underwent in 2017, not to his condition more generally. Any error committed by the ALJ in refusing to consider this evidence was therefore harmless.
The ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Handels subjective testimony. Valentine v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). Most notably, the ALJ cited Handels contention that he became disabled on the same day that he was laid off from a job he had held for seven years, and Handels receipt of unemployment benefits for a year after losing his job.
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To collect unemployment benefits, Handel had certified that he was able and willing to work, and he also applied for other jobs. The fact that Handel held himself out as capable of working during the same period that he now claims he was disabled casts doubt on his credibility. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the ALJs additional findings that Handel was capable of independently performing daily activities, that Handel told doctors that medication reduced his pain levels, and that Handel failed to follow up on referrals made by his doctors. The ALJ reasonably relied on these findings to afford less weight to Handels subjective testimony about his symptoms.
The ALJ did not err by discounting lay witness testimony from Handels friend, who is also the mother of his son. The ALJ must provide valid, germane reasons to discount lay witness testimony. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, the ALJ noted that the lay witnesss testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence from Handels neurological exam. Handel argues that his neurological exam is not inconsistent with the lay witnesss testimony because the neurologist noted that Handel had “worsening headaches” and “abnormalities on his brain MRI.” To the contrary, the record indicates that the neurologist restated Handels subjective statements about his headaches and referred him to other specialists for further testing. The neurologist also noted that Handels headaches may be “rebound headaches” from his pain medication and recommended that Handel work with his primary care provider to reduce or change the amount of medication he was taking. Handel did not pursue additional treatment according to the neurologists suggestions, which undermines his and the lay witnesss testimony about the severity of his condition. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJs residual functional capacity determination. In light of this determination, the ALJ did not err by concluding that Handel was not disabled because he could perform past relevant work as a general clerk. The ALJs vocational hypotheticals were also supported by substantial evidence. Handels challenges to this portion of the ALJs decision depends on his attacks on the ALJs residual functional capacity determination. For the foregoing reasons, these attacks fail. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. Handel testified that he was “forced to resign” due to his physical condition because he would get “snappy” when he was in pain. The ALJ rejected Handels testimony and concluded that Handels work “actually ended in a layoff” because Handel admitted that other employees were let go at the same time and the company was downsizing. Where, as here, “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” we must uphold the ALJs conclusion. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).