UDECHIME v. FAUST (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-29No. No. 20-15482

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Udechime's § 1983 action, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims inextricably intertwined with the prior state court judgment and that the facial constitutional challenge failed for lack of adequate factual allegations.

Elias Obidi Udechime appealed a district court dismissal of his federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the termination of his parental rights under Arizona law. Udechime brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations. The district court dismissed most of his claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. The court also dismissed Udechime's facial constitutional challenge to the Arizona statutes governing parental rights termination for failing to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.

The appellate court agreed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine properly barred claims seeking to overturn or challenge the validity of the prior state court judgment. For the facial challenge to the statutes themselves, Udechime had not alleged facts showing the laws were unconstitutional in every conceivable application or unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court properly declined to allow amendment because any revised complaint would face the same fatal defects.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar federal jurisdiction over claims challenging state court judgments
Standards for pleading a facial constitutional challenge to a statute
Dismissal without leave to amend based on futility

Procedural posture

Udechime appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims related to parental rights termination.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Elias Obidi Udechime appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims related to the termination of his parental rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Udechimes claims, other than his claims raising a facial challenge to the Arizona statutes governing parental rights termination, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because these claims constitute a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state courts decision was wrong and thus void.”).

Dismissal of Udechimes facial challenge to the Arizona statutes governing parental rights termination was proper because Udechime failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and conclusory allegations are not entitled to be assumed true (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (to succeed on a facial challenge, a challenger must show that a law is “unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or ․ seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally overbroad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 692 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (“Simply because a term is not defined does not render the statute unconstitutional.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Udechimes complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper if amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.