MEMORANDUM **
Claimant John Kaminski appeals from the district courts order affirming the Commissioners denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district courts order de novo and reverse only if the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was based on legal error. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.
1. The ALJ rejected consultative examining psychiatrist Charles DeBattista, M.D.’s opinion that Kaminski had marked and moderate-to-marked limitations in the relevant areas because these conclusions conflicted with other medical evidence and with the documented effectiveness of Kaminskis mental health treatment. On the record presented in this case, any argument that the ALJ erred by giving Dr. DeBattistas opinion only some weight fails. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. Contrary to Kaminskis assertions, the ALJ did not err by not addressing treating psychiatrists Cynthia Hunt, M.D. and Charles Edwards, M.D.’s treatment notes and social worker Susan Valencias documentation of his severe mental impairments when determining that Kaminski was not disabled. Because the treating psychiatrists’ treatment notes offered no opinion about the severity of Kaminskis mental impairments or any functional limitations that those impairments caused, they are not medical opinions that the ALJ must address in its disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1), 416.927(a)(1); Turner v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, Ms. Valencias documentation of Kaminskis auditory hallucinations, schizophrenia, and anxiety, without any assessment of their severity or functional limitations, is insufficient proof of disability. See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting “[t]he mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability”).
3. Kaminskis argument that substantial evidence does not support the ALJs residual functional capacity (RFC) finding fails because Kaminski does not specify what mental limitations, besides those for which the ALJ had already accounted in the RFC, follow from the impairments that he claims the ALJ failed to include in the RFC determination. See Valentine v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 n.2 . (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.