BAKER v. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-09-22No. No. 20-16218

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Baker's action for failure to prosecute, finding no abuse of discretion where Baker failed to attend her deposition.

Christine Baker appealed the dismissal of her Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims. The district court dismissed her action for failure to prosecute after Baker did not appear at her scheduled deposition. The appellate court reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing this dismissal sanction and found no abuse occurred.

The court applied the established five-factor test for evaluating dismissal sanctions in this circuit. Although dismissal is acknowledged as a severe remedy, the court determined the district court acted within its proper discretion when it dismissed Baker's case due to her failure to participate in a key discovery procedure. Because the court upheld the dismissal on this ground, it declined to address Baker's separate challenges to earlier interlocutory orders issued during the litigation.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether dismissal for failure to prosecute was an abuse of discretion
Application of the five-factor test for dismissal sanctions
Consequence of non-attendance at deposition

Procedural posture

Baker appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing her Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims for failure to prosecute.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Christine Baker appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing her action alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissal for failure to prosecute). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Bakers action for failure to prosecute after Baker failed to attend her deposition. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth five-factor test to be considered before dismissing for failure to prosecute); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (same five factors for dismissal under Rule 37); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although “dismissal is a harsh penalty,” the district courts dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In light of our disposition, we do not consider Bakers challenge to the district courts interlocutory orders. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after final judgment, are not appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the failure to prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.