MEMORANDUM **
Arizona prisoner Douglas Yokois appeals the district courts grant of summary judgment in favor of many Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”) officials on his exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the ADC officials on Yokois’ Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims because his religious practice was not substantially burdened.
1
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing RLUIPA); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the Free Exercise Clause). ADCs policy requiring inmates to go through authorized vendors to purchase religious items was at most, an inconvenience, and not a substantial burden on Yokois’ ability to acquire religious items. Similarly, the record shows that the ADC policy in question only prevented Yokois from pinning religious materials on his bulletin board while he was outside his cell and not using them. As a result, Yokois did not show that these policies so burdened his right to exercise his religion that he felt pressured to abandon his beliefs. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dept of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2013).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yokois’ motions to compel discovery, for appointment of counsel, and for injunctive relief. Yokois did not show that denial of his motions to compel resulted in actual or substantial prejudice to him. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor did he show any exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of counsel. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). And because Yokois requested injunctive relief unrelated to his exercise of religion claims, the district court properly denied his motions for a preliminary injunction. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queens Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2015).
2
Finally, the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Yokois’ motion for sanctions. Yokois had filed a notice of appeal, which “confer[red] jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divest[ed] the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S. Ct. 400, 402, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Because the district court properly granted summary judgment for the ADC officials on the merits of Yokois’ claims, we need not and do not consider whether the district court erred when it held that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies for two of them. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006).
2
. We note that there was no evidence that ADC officials did hinder Yokois’ ability to litigate his case. Cf. Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990).