SEVILLA AMAYA v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-16No. No. 17-72941

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for review was denied.

Gloria Sevilla-Amaya and her son petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of their asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief applications. The court found that Sevilla waived her right to challenge the Board's conclusion that she failed to demonstrate membership in a particular social group by not addressing this issue in her opening brief. Because establishing a nexus between persecution and a protected ground is essential to asylum eligibility, her failure to do so necessarily defeats both her asylum and withholding of removal claims. As for torture relief, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Sevilla did not establish she would more likely than not face torture if returned to El Salvador. Her general assertions about crime and corruption in the country were insufficient, and no evidence showed that a government official would acquiesce to torture, particularly since the government demonstrated willingness to investigate the reported crime.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Waiver of particular social group argument in asylum claim
Nexus requirement between persecution and protected ground
Sufficiency of evidence for Convention Against Torture relief
Government acquiescence to torture

Procedural posture

The petitioners sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief applications.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

Gloria Sevilla-Amaya (Sevilla) and her son, Steven Melar-Sevilla (Melar),

petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), dismissing their appeal of the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and review for substantial evidence. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended.

1. By not addressing the issue in her opening brief, Sevilla waived review of the Boards determination that Sevilla failed to establish membership in a particular social group as one central reason for any alleged persecution. See Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus, her asylum and withholding of removal claims necessarily fail. See Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring a demonstration of nexus); see also Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that failure to meet the eligibility requirements for asylum “necessarily” dooms a claim for withholding of removal).

2. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Sevilla failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief. Even assuming Sevilla suffered past torture, no evidence in the record demonstrated that she “more likely than not” would suffer torture if returned to El Salvador. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended. Sevillas general assertions about crime and corruption are not sufficient to sustain a claim of torture. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).

Further, no evidence demonstrated that a public official would acquiesce to any torture. The crime was reported to the prosecutors office, and there is no indications in the record of the governments inability or unwillingness to investigate. See Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1034.

PETITION DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

. Melar is a derivative beneficiary of Sevillas asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). As no derivative status exists for withholding of removal and the CAT, and Melar failed to file separate applications for such relief, he is not eligible for those forms of relief. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).