ESTATE OF MANSTROM GREENING THROUGH MANSTROM v. LANE COUNTY (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-18No. No. 20-35072

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claims but reversed the dismissal of the state negligence claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.

Carol Manstrom, acting as personal representative of her son's estate, appealed a summary judgment ruling that dismissed claims against her son's father Glenn Greening and Lane County officials. William Manstrom-Greening died by suicide using his father's loaded, unsecured gun left on a desk in their shared home. The estate brought both a state negligence claim against the father and federal constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment against the father and county parole and probation officials.

The appellate court found that the lower court incorrectly dismissed the negligence claim. Under Oregon law, the foreseeability standard focuses on whether an actor should have anticipated the general type of risk that occurred, not the precise sequence of events. Because leaving a loaded, accessible gun in a home where others live creates an obvious foreseeable risk of self-harm or harm to others, a jury could reasonably conclude the father's conduct was negligent when his son used that gun to take his own life.

However, the court upheld the dismissal of the constitutional claims. The federal doctrine protecting against state-created dangers requires proof that state actors knowingly and deliberately exposed someone to a specific danger they recognized. The record contained no evidence that the father knew his son was suicidal yet intentionally left the gun accessible anyway, so no deliberate indifference could be found. Because no underlying constitutional violation occurred, the claims against the county officials also failed.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether leaving a loaded gun accessible in a home creates a foreseeable risk of self-harm or harm to others under Oregon negligence law
Whether state actors violated substantive due process by affirmatively creating danger with deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment
Whether knowledge of suicidal ideation is required to establish deliberate indifference in a state-created danger claim

Procedural posture

The Estate appealed from a district court order granting summary judgment to all defendants on all claims.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Carol Manstrom brings this action in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of her son, William Han Manstrom-Greening. The Estate alleges the following claims: (1) a state-law negligence claim against Glenn Greening, Williams father; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Greening in his capacity as a state actor; and (3) a Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983 against Lane County, Lane County Parole and Probation, and Donovan Dumire, the Manager of Parole and Probation. The Estate appeals from the district courts order granting summary judgment to defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

1. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Greening on the state-law negligence claim. Under Oregon negligence law, an actor is negligent if he “ought reasonably to foresee that he will expose another to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or. 603, 469 P.2d 783, 786 (1970). The concept of foreseeability “refers to generalized risks of the type of incidents and injuries that occurred rather than predictability of the actual sequence of events.” Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or. 1, 734 P.2d 1326, 1338 (1987). Here, the generalized risk of harm resulting from Greenings act of leaving a loaded gun on a desk in the living room is that someone else living in the home could harm themselves or another with the gun, either intentionally or accidentally. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened when William used Greenings gun to take his own life. A reasonable jury could find that Williams suicide was within the realm of foreseeable risks resulting from Greenings act of leaving his loaded gun readily accessible and unsecured. See Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or. 58, 377 P.3d 492, 512–13 (2016).

2. The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The state-created danger doctrine holds state actors liable for violating a persons substantive due process right to bodily integrity when the state actors “affirmatively and with deliberate indifference placed that person in danger.” Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, the record does not show that Greening acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. See Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). No rational jury could find that Greening knew about Williams suicidal ideation and nevertheless chose to leave a loaded gun accessible. Thus, there is no showing that Greening recognized the risk that William might take his own life and intended to expose William to that risk. See Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2018). Because there is no showing of deliberate indifference, we need not reach the issue of whether Greening acted affirmatively or under color of state law.

Without an underlying constitutional violation by Greening, we also need not address whether Dumire and the County defendants ratified Greenings conduct. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127–28, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part; CASE REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.