PERALTA GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-17No. No. 18-71046

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for review is denied. The court affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that Peralta's proposed social groups lacked the requisite particularity to constitute a legally cognizable particular social group for purposes of withholding of removal.

Arely Marlizeth Peralta Gutierrez, a Mexican citizen, sought withholding of removal from the United States based on a claim that she would face persecution in Mexico. She argued that she belonged to particular social groups—specifically "single women in households" and "women in households where men are not present"—and that she would be persecuted because of her membership in these groups, based on harassment she experienced as a teenager. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals both denied her application, finding that her proposed social groups did not meet legal requirements.

The court reviewed the agency's decision and agreed that Peralta's proposed groups failed to satisfy the legal standard for what constitutes a "particular social group." The definitions she offered were too vague and expansive, encompassing vastly different types of people and circumstances. For instance, "single women in households" could mean women living alone, widows, or those in various relationship statuses, while "women in households where men are not present" could apply to situations ranging from temporary absences to death or abandonment. Because the boundaries of these groups were insufficiently clear and distinct, they could not qualify as cognizable social groups under immigration law.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether proposed social groups meet the particularity requirement under withholding of removal law
Definition and boundaries of particular social groups for immigration purposes
Whether vague and overbroad group definitions satisfy legal standards

Procedural posture

Peralta petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmance of the Immigration Judge's denial of her withholding of removal application.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

Arely Marlizeth Peralta Gutierrez (“Peralta”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for withholding of removal.

We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

To establish her eligibility for withholding of removal, Peralta had to show that, if removed to Mexico, she would likely suffer persecution “because of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(C). Before the agency, Peralta asserted that she would be persecuted on account of her membership in two proposed social groups—viz., “single women in households” and “women in households where men are not present.” She based this contention on the repeated harassment that she had experienced between the ages of 12 and 16 from a man in her town known as “El Güero.” The BIA affirmed the IJs denial of withholding of removal, holding that Peraltas proposed social groups were “insufficiently particularized to meet the particularity requirement for a legally cognizable particular social group” and that, in any event, she had failed “to demonstrate the requisite nexus” between the alleged harassment and her membership in these proposed groups. In addressing this decision, we review the agencys legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

We agree with the BIA that Peraltas proposed social groups do not satisfy the particularity requirement. Particularity means that “the social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (simplified). In other words, “the relevant society must have a ‘commonly accepted definition[ ]’ of the group.” Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “ ‘The group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Here, both of Peraltas proposed groups comprise “a variety of different individuals ․ who do not form a cohesive” group and therefore lack particularity. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

As to the first group, the phrase “single women in households” could connote many different types of individuals: those who live entirely alone; widows; those who are not married but are in romantic relationships; and those who are neither married nor in a romantic relationship. The second proposed group—women in households where men are not present—is likewise too diffuse and amorphous. Men might not be “present” in a womans household in a wide array of very different circumstances: they might be away for work for a brief or extended period of time; they might have abandoned their homes; they might be deceased; or they might have gone missing. The ill-defined nature of the boundaries of these groups is underscored by the fact that Peralta believed herself to be a member of both groups even though she testified that one of her adult male uncles did live with her in her grandmothers house in Mexico. Because these two proposed groups are defined in such an overbroad, amorphous, and diffuse manner, they lack the sort of “ ‘sufficiently distinct’ ” boundaries needed to qualify as a “ ‘discrete class of persons’ ” within the relevant society. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1091 (citation omitted).

In the absence of a showing that she is a member of a “particular social group” within the meaning of the INA, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), Peraltas claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails and the BIA properly rejected that claim. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (applicant has the burden to establish the elements of a withholding claim). We therefore need not address the BIAs alternative holding that Peralta also failed to establish the requisite nexus between her proposed social groups and any asserted past or future persecution.

The petition for review is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

. The BIA also rejected Peraltas application for relief under the Convention Against Torture, but Peralta does not challenge that ruling in her opening brief and the point is therefore forfeited. See Balser v. Dept of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2003).