TURO INC v. << (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-03-10No. No. 20-55729, No. 20-55731

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court reversed the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings because the City failed to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, one of the four required elements for preliminary injunctive relief.

Turo, an online car-sharing platform, and three of its individual users appealed a preliminary injunction that barred them from conducting vehicle handoffs at Los Angeles International Airport without city authorization. The appellate court reviewed whether the City of Los Angeles met the legal requirements for obtaining such an injunction, focusing particularly on whether the City demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm without immediate court intervention.

The court found that the City failed to adequately show irreparable harm. Although Turo facilitated approximately 127 vehicle handoffs daily at LAX, this volume was negligible compared to the airport's overall traffic of roughly 100,000 vehicles per day passing through the central terminal area and over 30,000 daily pickups and drop-offs by ride-sharing services, taxis, and limousines. An expert witness for Turo, whose testimony went unchallenged by the City, opined that Turo's transaction volume was immaterial and unnoticeable within the context of total airport traffic. Given these facts, the court concluded the City had not made a sufficient showing that Turo's operations would cause irreparable harm justifying emergency relief.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the City demonstrated likelihood of irreparable harm from Turo's airport operations
Sufficiency of evidence showing traffic impact from 127 daily vehicle handoffs amid 100,000 total daily vehicles at LAX
Proper evidentiary standard for establishing irreparable harm in preliminary injunction proceedings

Procedural posture

Turo Inc. and three individual vehicle owners appealed from the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction that prohibited vehicle handoffs at LAX without city authorization.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Turo Inc., an online car-sharing platform, and Eric Kwan, Andras Smulovics, and Andrey Kornakov, individuals who rent out their vehicles through Turo, appeal from the district courts issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting them from arranging or conducting any vehicle handoffs at Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”) without first obtaining authorization from the City of Los Angeles (the “City”). We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the issuance of the preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we reverse the order granting the injunction, vacate the injunction, and remand for further proceedings.

1. Turo, Kwan, Smulovics, and Kornakov contend that the district court erred in entering a preliminary injunction against them. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “We review the district courts determination that the plaintiff satisfied each of these four factors for abuse of discretion.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision relies ‘on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous finding of fact.’ ” Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)).

We hold that the district court erred in determining that the City met its burden to establish that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. To establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, the moving party must provide more than conclusory or speculative allegations. Herb Reed Enter., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365.

Here, the district court based its determination that the City would likely suffer irreparable harm on its finding that, as of 2018, “approximately 127 vehicles were handed off at LAX as a result of Turo every day” and that Turos “operations are in fact specifically impacting traffic flow at LAX—at least to some degree.” But the record also shows that, during the same period, there were more than 30,000 pickups and drop offs at LAX per day by transportation network companies (like Uber and Lyft), taxis, and limousines. Counting all forms of traffic, the City alleges that approximately 100,000 vehicles pass through LAXs central terminal area per day. Turo also presented expert opinion testimony, unrebutted by the City, stating that “Turo user handoff volumes are immaterial and essentially unnoticeable in the context of overall traffic volumes at LAX.” On this record, we conclude that the City has not adequately shown that Turos 127 transactions at LAX per day impact traffic conditions at the airport to such a degree that the City will be irreparably harmed in the absence of immediate relief.

Having determined that the City has not made an adequate showing of the likelihood of irreparable harm on this record, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the remaining elements of the preliminary injunction test. See DISH Network Corp. v. F.C.C., 653 F.3d 771, 782 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Turo also seeks review of the district courts denial of Turos motion to dismiss the Citys counterclaims on the ground that they are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Turo asserts that the issues presented in the motion to dismiss are “inextricably intertwined” with the review of the merits of the preliminary injunction, which this court separately has jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Arc of Cal., 757 F.3d at 992–93 (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2012)). Because we do not address the Citys likelihood of success on the merits in the context of its request for a preliminary injunction, we decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Turos appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss. See Perfect 10, Inc., 653 F.3d at 982 n.3.

We therefore REVERSE the district courts order granting the Citys motion for a preliminary injunction, VACATE the preliminary injunction, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.