MEMORANDUM **
Antquan Durpree Clay appeals pro se from the district courts summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from a strip search while he was a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Clays excessive force claim against defendant Harris because Clay failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the force used to compel the search was objectively unreasonable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (setting forth standard for an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Clays unreasonable search claim against defendant Harris because Clay failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the search was unreasonable. See Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971-74 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (setting forth factors relevant to reasonableness of pretrial detention search, including whether a search is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.