UNITED STATES v. CARTER (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.2021-04-08No. No. 20-2409

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of compassionate release, finding no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that the inmate failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting early release.

Clemmie Carter, an HIV-positive federal inmate, sought early release from prison citing elevated health risks during the COVID-19 pandemic. He argued that his compromised immune system made him vulnerable to severe illness if he contracted the virus, and he pointed to his positive institutional conduct as supporting factors. The trial court rejected the request, finding that Carter had not demonstrated the extraordinary and compelling circumstances required by law, particularly since his HIV was being effectively managed through medication and the prison facility had no active COVID cases at the time.

On appeal, Carter contended that the trial judge underestimated the severity of HIV as a chronic immunosuppressive condition and relied on sentencing guidelines provisions that he believed addressed his medical status. The appellate court disagreed with both arguments. The court determined that the judge properly exercised discretion in evaluating whether Carter's condition truly exposed him to exceptional danger, and clarified that the guideline provision Carter cited applies only to requests initiated by the Bureau of Prisons, not individual inmates.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether HIV-positive status constitutes extraordinary and compelling grounds for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
Application of Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 in inmate-initiated versus Bureau of Prisons-initiated compassionate release motions
Standard of review for trial court discretion in denying compassionate release petitions

Procedural posture

The inmate appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

ORDER

Clemmie Carter, a federal inmate who is being treated for HIV, sought compassionate release based on his heightened risk of contracting a severe case of COVID-19. The district court denied the motion after finding that no evidence supported Carters argument that his condition made him particularly vulnerable to the virus. Because the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.

Carter is housed at the Federal Correctional Institution Beckley in West Virginia and has a projected release date in October 2023. He pleaded guilty in 2014 to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d); and brandishing a firearm, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); for which he received a 138-month sentence.

In May 2020 Carter moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Based on information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, he argued that his HIV-positive status increased the risk of serious complications if he contracted COVID-19. He insisted that the Bureau of Prisons had responded poorly to controlling outbreaks of the virus and that social distancing in a prison environment was impossible. Carter also asked the judge to take into account his favorable post-sentencing conduct—a clean prison disciplinary record, successful coursework, and satisfactory job performance.

The judge denied the motion because Carter had not made a showing of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The judge explained that Carter was only 29 and that he presented no evidence that his HIV condition—which was being controlled with treatment—made him particularly vulnerable to the virus. Further, the prison reported no active COVID-19 cases.

On appeal Carter argues that the judge minimized the seriousness of HIV—a chronic condition that compromises the immune system. He highlights the commentary in application note 1 of § 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which defines “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to include defendants like himself who are “suffering from a serious ․ medical condition.”

The judge acted within his discretion in denying relief. The judge acknowledged the chronic nature of Carters condition but reasonably determined that it was not so severe to make him particularly vulnerable to the virus. As the judge explained, his condition was “regularly monitored” and “under control,” and the prison had no reported COVID-19 cases. And as for Carters reference to § 1B1.13, that guideline applies to motions brought by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Because Carter, rather than the Director, brought this motion, the guideline is not controlling. See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2020).

Lastly, to the extent Carter suggests that the judge erred by not weighing the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), he misapprehends the inquiry under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As that provision states, a judge may reduce the sentence upon consideration of the § 3553(a) factors only “if [he] finds that ․ extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). Here, that condition precedent was not met.

AFFIRMED