UNITED STATES v. ROSALES (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.2021-01-27No. No. 19-3524

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appeal is dismissed. The district court properly recharacterized Rosales's motion as one under § 2255 rather than Rule 60(b)(6), and because the motion was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations, the court denies Rosales's request for a certificate of appealability.

Salvador Rosales, convicted of drug offenses years earlier, filed a motion seeking a new trial or resentencing, claiming the government had erred in its initial notice regarding his prior convictions under federal sentencing enhancement law. Although Rosales labeled his motion as one for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the district court properly recharacterized it as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which governs post-conviction challenges to sentences. The court denied the motion as untimely because it was filed eight years after Rosales's conviction became final, well beyond the one-year statute of limitations established by § 2255.

On appeal, Rosales argued that the district court erred in applying § 2255 rather than Rule 60(b)(6). The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that any post-judgment motion in a criminal case seeking to vacate or correct a sentence must be treated as a § 2255 motion, regardless of how the defendant labels it. Because the motion was barred by the statute of limitations, the court declined to issue a certificate of appealability necessary to proceed with the appeal.

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Key issues

Whether a motion captioned under Rule 60(b)(6) must be recharacterized as a § 2255 motion when it seeks to vacate or correct a sentence
Whether the one-year statute of limitations in § 2255 bars a post-conviction motion filed eight years after conviction became final
Whether the district court's failure to warn a pro se litigant before recharacterization was harmless error

Procedural posture

Rosales appealed the district court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment, which the district court treated as an untimely § 2255 motion despite being captioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

ORDER

Years after his conviction for drug offenses, Salvador Rosales moved for a new trial or resentencing based on an alleged error in the governments notice to him before sentencing about his past convictions. Rosales sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), but the district court treated his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and denied it as untimely. Because the district court correctly handled the motion, we deny Rosaless implied request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Before Rosaless trial, the government notified him that it would seek a statutory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment based on Rosaless prior felony drug conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The original notice wrongly stated that Rosales was convicted of “manufacturing/delivery” of cocaine; he was only charged with that offense and was convicted instead of felony possession of cocaine. The government corrected its error before sentencing, the district court applied the sentence enhancement, and we affirmed that decision on appeal. United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 2011).

Eight years after we affirmed his conviction, Rosales moved for relief from judgment, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). He argued that the governments amendment to its § 851 notice after trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights, so he was entitled to a new trial or resentencing. The district court denied his request as an untimely motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which sets forth a one-year time limit. Id. § 2255(f). On appeal, Rosales argues that the district court erred in considering his motion under § 2255 instead of Rule 60(b)(6).

Although Rosales captioned his motion as one for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, the district court properly applied § 2255. “[A]ny post-judgment motion in a criminal proceeding that fits the description of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence ․ should be treated as a section 2255 motion.” United States v. Carraway, 478 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–83, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (describing procedure for federal district courts to recharacterize pro se litigants post-conviction motion to match its substance and legal basis). Rosaless motion sought to vacate or alter his sentence and obtain a new trial or resentencing. It was thus a motion under § 2255, regardless of its label.

Before recharacterizing Rosaless motion, the district court should have given him “an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he has,” Castro, 540 U.S. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 786, but the lack of that opportunity here was harmless. As mentioned above, § 2255 has a one-year statute of limitations, which began to run when Rosaless conviction became final in 2012, and thus had expired when Rosales filed his motion in 2019. See § 2255(f). Because he waited too long to seek relief, a “warning would have led either to the motions withdrawal or to its conversion; in either event [Rosales] would lose.” See Wilson v. United States, 413 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005).

Because the district court permissibly recharacterized Rosaless motion, we must dismiss his appeal. To proceed with an appeal on a motion under § 2255, Rosales must first request and receive a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Carraway, 478 F.3d at 849. We construe his notice of appeal and brief as a request for that certificate. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); Sanchez-Rengifo v. Caraway, 798 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2015). But we deny the request because, for two reasons, Rosales has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). First, as we have previously ruled, the error in the governments first 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice was “beyond harmless.” Gaya, 647 F.3d at 642; see also United States v. Rosales, 818 F. Appx 565, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of motion to reduce sentence). Second, we cannot grant Rosales a certificate of appealability because his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was untimely. See West v. Schneiter, 485 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Davis v. Borgen, 349 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2003).

DISMISSED