MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Omar Burton (Burton), appeals the trial courts Order regarding credit days.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Burton presents the court with three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
(1) Whether the trial court improperly adjusted the credit days applied to Burtons sentence in this matter; and
(2) Whether Burtons claim that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the trial courts Order adjusting his credit days is properly before us.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On February 20, 2015, the State filed an Information in Jennings County under cause number 40C01-1502-F4-000007 (Cause F4-007), charging Burton with Level 4 felony burglary, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 6 felony residential entry, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Between Burtons arrest on February 12, 2015, and October 5, 2016, Burton was held at the Jennings County Jail on these charges, and he served time at the Branchville Correctional Facility on a parole violation in cause number 03D01-9605-CF-454 (Cause CF-454).
[5] On October 6, 2016, Burton pleaded guilty in Cause F4-007 to the Level 4 felony burglary charge pursuant to an agreement with the State that he would receive an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction (DOC), to be served consecutively to his CF-454 parole violation sentence. The plea agreement also provided that the trial court could recommend Burton for Purposeful Incarceration but that Burton could not petition for a modification of his sentence solely based upon its completion. Prior to taking Burtons change of plea, the trial court reviewed the terms of his plea agreement and the rights Burton would waive with his guilty plea. Burton expressed his opinion that the 602 days of credit time that had accrued from the date of his arrest to the date of his plea should apply to his sentence on the newer Cause F4-007 charges and not to his parole violation sentence. The trial court asked Burton if he understood that “[a]ny other charges filed in this case would be dismissed as part of this plea, and this sentence thats being imposed today would be consecutive to [the sentence in CF-454], and you would receive [602] days credit either on this case or that case, but not both.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 12). Burton affirmed that he understood this.
[6] The trial court accepted Burtons plea and sentenced him to eight years. On December 27, 2016, the trial court issued its written sentencing order that provided, in relevant part, that the “sentence shall be served consecutively to [CF-454]. [Burton] shall receive credit for six hundred two (602) actual days in the Jennings County Jail (2/12/15 – 10/5/16).” (Appellants App. Vol. II, p. 26).
[7] On December 1, 2020, the trial court issued its Order Regarding Credit Days. The trial court ruled that, because it had been informed on November 25, 2020, by the DOC that Burton was serving time on his Cause CF-454 parole violation at the time his 602 days of credit time was accruing, and because his sentences in Causes CF-454 and F4-007 were to be served consecutively, his 602 days of credit time would be applied to the Cause CF-454 sentence. The trial court ordered an amended abstract of judgment for Cause F4-007 to be issued to reflect its ruling and to show zero credit days in Cause F4-007.
[8] Burton now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Removal of Credit Time from Cause F4-007
[9] Burton challenges the trial courts Order removing 602 days of credit time from Cause F4-007. More specifically, Burton claims that the trial court erroneously modified his sentence and violated the terms of his plea agreement. Inasmuch as addressing Burtons claims entails interpreting statutes or his plea agreement, those are matters that we review de novo. Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019); Anderson v. State, 141 N.E.3d 862, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.
[10] Relying primarily on the sentencing modification statute, Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17, Burton argues that the trial court improperly modified his sentence by removing his 602 credit days from Cause F4-007 outside of his presence and without notice to him or his counsel. Burton does not argue that the error was in applying the credit days to Cause CF-454 or that he did not receive the credit days in Cause CF-454. Rather, he contends that the trial court improperly removed the credit days from Cause F4-007 instead of applying the 602 days to both Causes. Burtons argument that the trial court improperly modified his sentence is not persuasive, as a defendants credit days are determined by statute and are not part of the sentence rendered by a trial court. See Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because pre-sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory rights, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit.”). The trial court did not re-sentence Burton when it removed his credit days from Cause F4-007, and the sentencing modification statute is not applicable here. Furthermore, Burton was not entitled to 602 days of credit time against both Causes. As Burton acknowledged before pleading guilty, he was eligible for 602 days of credit time to be applied to either Cause F4-007 or Cause CF-454, but not to both. See French v. State, 754 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]hen a defendant is incarcerated on multiple offenses and is ordered to serve his sentences consecutively, he is not entitled to double credit.”).
[11] Burtons argument that the trial court impermissibly violated the terms of his plea agreement meets the same fate. Because a defendants entitlement to credit days is a statutory right, it is not a term of a plea agreement that is negotiated with the State. Indeed, Burtons plea agreement did not mention credit days. Burton was statutorily-entitled to 602 credit days, which he received in Cause CF-454. He was not entitled to the 1204 days which he is seeking, by statute or by virtue of his plea agreement. Id. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it removed the 602 credit days from Cause F4-007.
1
II. Involuntary Plea
[12] Burton asserts that the trial courts removal of the 602 credit days from this Cause rendered his guilty plea involuntary. However, Burtons claim is not properly before us. “One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal.” Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996). A defendant who pleads guilty may directly appeal the trial courts sentencing decision where the trial court has exercised sentencing discretion, and a defendant may directly appeal the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. Hoskins v. State, 143 N.E.3d 358, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Any other claims are only properly brought through a petition for post-conviction relief. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001). Therefore, in this direct appeal, we do not address Burtons claim that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the trial courts Order.
CONCLUSION
[13] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it issued its Order reflecting that Burtons credit time had been applied to another case. In addition, we do not address Burtons claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because it is not properly before us.
[14] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Burton also argues in passing that the trial court violated the terms of his plea agreement when it did not recommend him for Purposeful Incarceration, either in the original abstract of judgment or in the amended abstract. We decline to address this issue because he has not included a copy of the original abstract in the record on appeal and he has not requested that we render him any relief based on that claimed error.
Riley, Judge.
[15] Najam, J. and Brown, J. concur