UNITED STATES v. POSPISIL (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.2021-07-20No. No. 20-2375

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed because officers acted in good faith when searching the cell phone under a warrant authorizing seizure and search of 'electronic data processing and storage devices, computer[s,] and computer systems,' even assuming the phone fell outside the warrant's literal scope.

Harley Pospisil was charged with receiving and possessing child pornography after police discovered illegal images on his cell phone and laptop. Police obtained a search warrant that authorized seizure and search of 'electronic data processing and storage devices, computer[s,] and computer systems' in his home, though the warrant did not explicitly mention cell phones. When officers executed the warrant, they searched both devices and found contraband on both. Pospisil moved to suppress the evidence from his cell phone, arguing it fell outside the warrant's scope.

The court assumed for purposes of review that the cell phone was indeed beyond the warrant's scope but held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court found it objectively reasonable for officers to believe that a warrant authorizing search of 'electronic data processing and storage devices' and 'computer systems' encompassed a smartphone, particularly given that the defendant's girlfriend had already informed police the phone contained the suspicious images. The court relied on precedent involving similar broad warrant language to conclude that any officer misinterpretation was a reasonable, honest mistake permitted under the Fourth Amendment.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a cell phone is encompassed by warrant language authorizing search of 'electronic data processing and storage devices'
Application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when warrant language is ambiguous
Distinction between warrantless searches incident to arrest and searches conducted pursuant to a warrant

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone during execution of a search warrant, after entering a guilty plea while reserving his right to appeal.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

[Unpublished]

Harley Pospisil was charged with receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court

denied his motion to suppress images from his cell phone, and he pleaded guilty. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Pospisils girlfriend, Cathy Klay,

told police that she found thousands of suspicious pictures on Pospisils computer and cell phone. She copied them onto storage devices and turned them over to police. She also gave them a written statement explaining that she found the pictures on Pospisils computer and on his Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

After police saw the images, an officer applied for a warrant. A Missouri state judge issued a warrant authorizing police to seize and search “any and all electronic data processing and storage devices, computer[s,] and computer systems” found in Pospisils home. D. Ct. Dkt. 115 at 3. Neither the affidavit nor the warrant specifically mentioned a cell phone. When officers executed the warrant, they found a laptop and a cell phone. Pospisil admitted to owning both. Police found child pornography on both devices and arrested him.

Pospisil was charged with one count of receiving child pornography and two counts of possessing child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence from his cell phone, arguing that the phone was outside the scope of the warrant. The district court denied his motion. Pospisil then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial. He was given a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months.

Pospisil raises one issue on appeal: whether the evidence seized from his cell phone should have been suppressed because the warrant did not specifically include cell phones.

II.

“On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district courts findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires search warrants to be supported by probable cause and to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. If evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). But if that evidence is obtained pursuant to a search warrant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule may apply. Id. at 922–23, 104 S.Ct. 3405.

Pospisil first argues that because the search warrant did not list his cell phone, all the evidence seized from the phone must be suppressed. Pospisil tries to draw a parallel between his case and Riley v. California, but his argument falls short. While Riley dealt with “warrantless search[es] incident to a lawful arrest,” 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), the officers here got a warrant to seize and search “electronic data processing and storage devices, computer[s,] and computer systems” before entering Pospisils home. D. Ct. Dkt. 115 at 3. This is not like the warrantless searches in Riley.

Pospisil alternatively argues that the Leon good faith exception cannot apply to the search of his cell phone. He says that because police were “armed with sufficient knowledge ․ to name [Pospisils] Samsung phone ․ with sufficient particularity” but failed to list the phone, applying the Leon good faith exception here would “reward[ ] negligent or careless police work.” Pospisil Br. 17.

For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that Pospisils cell phone was beyond the warrants scope.

The question, then, is “whether the officers reasonably believed that the warrant authorized the search, even if their interpretation was mistaken.” United States v. Suellentrop, 953 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted).

The warrant here authorized seizing and searching “electronic data processing and storage devices, computer[s,] and computer systems.” D. Ct. Dkt. 115 at 3. In Suellentrop, a case involving a similar warrant, we explained that “it was not unreasonable for investigators to believe that the state warrant authorized the search of [the defendants] phone, along with other electronic devices that might be found [in his home].” 953 F.3d at 1051. Consistent with Suellentrop, we conclude that searching Pospisils cell phone was at least “among the objectively reasonable honest mistakes that the Fourth Amendment tolerates.” Id.; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here.

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

. The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, partially adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Noelle C. Collins, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

. Ms. Klays last name is spelled more than one way in the record. For consistencys sake, we adopt the spelling used in the Magistrates report and recommendations. D. Ct. Dkt. 105 at 2.

. The district court did the same, noting that the Government “did not object to the Magistrate Judges conclusion that the cell phone was not covered by the warrant.” D. Ct. Dkt. 115 at 4 n.2.

PER CURIAM.