UNITED STATES v. JACKSON (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.2021-07-09No. No. 20-2495

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's judgment imposing an 18-month prison sentence and 24-month supervised release term.

Todd Jackson appealed his sentence imposed after he violated the conditions of his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to 18 months in prison followed by 24 months of additional supervised release. Although Jackson's 18-month prison term exceeded the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 3 to 9 months, the appellate court found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly considered the required statutory sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion in weighing them. The court rejected Jackson's argument that rehabilitation could have been achieved with a shorter sentence, explaining that the sentencing judge was entitled to reach a different conclusion about the appropriate weight to give that factor.

The court also rejected challenges to the imposition of an additional supervised release term, finding no abuse of discretion even though the government had not requested it. The court emphasized that determining an appropriate sentence is the district court's responsibility, not the parties', and the court must consider the statutory factors and case circumstances independently. Although the district court mentioned "incapacitation" and retribution during sentencing, the court found these references did not constitute reversible error, as incapacitation is a proper sentencing consideration and retribution was mentioned only in passing.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Reasonableness of a revocation sentence exceeding Sentencing Guidelines range
Proper consideration of statutory sentencing factors in revocation sentencing
Propriety of imposing supervised release term not requested by government
Significance of passing reference to retribution factor in revocation sentencing

Procedural posture

Jackson appealed his supervised release revocation sentence imposed by the district court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

[Unpublished]

After violating the conditions of supervised release, Todd Jackson received a two-part sentence: 18 months in prison, followed by an additional 24 months of supervised release. Though he challenges both parts of the sentence, we affirm.

We conclude that the first part, the 18-month prison sentence, is substantively reasonable, even though it exceeded the advisory range of three to nine months under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Marrow Bone, 378 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the reasonableness of an above-Guidelines-range revocation sentence for an abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Hall, 931 F.3d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e have repeatedly stated that [upward] variances are appropriate based on repeated violations of supervised release․”). The record establishes that the district court

sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(3), and did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing them. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2006). Even though Jackson believes that a shorter sentence would have done the job, particularly if the goal was rehabilitation, the court did not have to agree. See United States v. Carrillo, 982 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he mere fact that the court could have weighed the sentencing factors differently does not amount to an abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Nor did the district court “give significant weight to an improper factor.” United States v. Boykin, 850 F.3d 985, 988–89 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The courts reference to “incapacitation” during the sentencing hearing was simply shorthand for “the need ․ to protect the public,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), which is not an improper factor, see id. § 3583(e)(3) (permitting consideration of this factor). And although the court mentioned retribution, which is an “excluded factor” when setting a revocation sentence, Hall, 931 F.3d at 697, it did so only in passing. See United States v. Porter, 974 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that merely “mentioning” an improper factor, without more, is not reversible error); United States v. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming when the district court “focused primarily on [the defendants] history and characteristics rather than ․ retribution for the offenses”).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in imposing another supervised-release term, even though the government did not ask for one. See United States v. Defoor, 535 F.3d 763, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2008) (reviewing the decision to impose a “new term of supervised release” for an abuse of discretion). After all, “[i]t is the district courts responsibility, ․ and not the parties’ prerogative, to determine the appropriate sentence after taking into account the [statutory sentencing] factors and the circumstances of a particular case.” United States v. McKay, 775 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2015); accord United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Governments opinion of the appropriate sentence ․ d[oes] not prevent the district court from making its own determination․”).

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

. The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.

PER CURIAM.